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Institutional Voids and Tax litigation in Emerging Economies: The verdict 
of Vodafone cross-border acquisition of Hutchison 
 
 
Abstract 
Extensive research on cross-border mergers and acquisitions performed in different 
institutional settings shows that legal and regulatory infrastructure, level of investor 
protection, and key macroeconomic factors are the most important determinants. With 
this in mind, we analyze and discuss the telecommunications market leader Vodafone’s 
cross-border acquisition of Hutchison equity stake in CGP Investments, which has long-
time delayed (litigated) in an Asian emerging market‒India‒in the view of corporate 
gains tax. Regarding theory testing and development, we test 14 theories and two 
theorems that have propounded in five management research forums, namely 
international economics, international business (IB), strategic management, organization 
studies, and corporate finance. Further, based on shortcomings of the existing theories 
we develop new theory‒Farmers Fox Theory‒and offer lawful propositions for future 
research that would advance the existing IB knowledge on Institutional Voids in Emerging 
Economies. We therefore conclude that a given country’s weak regulatory system benefits 
both the acquirer and the target firm; at the same time, this economic behavior would 
adversely affect its fiscal income or budget. Lastly, we offer some policy guidelines for 
legal and regulatory system, and suggest fruitful recommendations for multinational 
managers.  
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Keywords: Cross-border mergers and acquisitions; Foreign direct investment; Hutchison 
Whampoa; Vodafone; Internationalization; Corporate governance; Emerging 
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1. Introduction 
In Hymer’s view, “modern multinational enterprises (MNEs) are interested in 
manufacturing in underdeveloped countries and not just in raw materials and therefore 
want a growing market for advanced products and an educated, urbanized labour force” 
(Hymer, 1970: 447). Thus, “international business environment is an amorphous 
aggregate of several elements that differ along geographical, social, political and economic 
dimensions […] for instance, geography, economy or culture, remain relatively stable over 
time, while others like exchange rates are more volatile” (Sethi and Guisinger, 2002: 228). 
Furthermore, it is fact that “foreign subsidiaries experience a competitive disadvantage, 
because local firms have better information about the local competitive environment, 
including the economy, language, social needs and preferences, law, and politics” (Bell et 
al., 2012: 109), just to mention a few. 
The above paragraph or a synopsis of the valid previous contributions has raised two 
important questions. First, who have developed theories like theory of foreign direct 
investment (FDI), internalization theory, institutional theory, organizational learning theory, 
and so forth? Our straightforward answer is ‘researchers in economics and social sciences’. 
Second, are these theories in economics or social sciences developed based on evidence, 
reliability and assumption? Thus, our specific answer is ‘no (or, not all)’; however, some 
theories like those that information asymmetry theory, liability of foreignness, and theories 
in psychology have developed based on both theoretical backdrop and empirical evidence. 
Hence, our intention is not at reviewing or criticizing the theories that have advocated in 
business and economics field. Regarding international business (IB) research, most scholars 
have brought different theories of different research forums (for instance, economics, 
psychology, politics, finance, accounting, and strategic management), and tested those 
theories in international, global and cross-country perspectives. Of course, there are some 
important theories developed by IB scholars, for instance, theory of firm internationalization 
(Johanson and Vahlne, 1977), liability of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995), and theorems like 
subsidiary-specific advantages (Rugman and Verbeke, 2001) and learning-by-doing (Collins 
et al., 2009). Indeed, most of the theories, too, are complimentary, rather than substitutable, 
to each other (Dunning, 2000).1 Although, the theories that developed in other streams and 
tested in IB are not perfect-fit to explain the current IB environment that is evolved across 
the cosmos. On the other hand, we found significant editorial and commentary articles on 
problems (prospects) in IB (e.g. Caves, 1998; Peng, 2004) and qualitative research in IB (e.g. 
Birkinshaw et al., 2011; Doz, 2011; Tsang, forthcoming; Welch et al., 2011), which 
                                                          
1 In his view, “I have frequently asserted that no single theory can be expected to satisfactorily encompass 
all kinds of foreign-owned value-added activity simply because the motivations for, and expectations from, 
such production vary a great deal” (Dunning, 2001: 176). 
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published in Journal of International Business Studies (JIBS), Journal of World Business (JWB), 
and International Business Review (IBR), just to name a few. 
From the aforesaid paragraphs, we understand that there is a need, urgency and 
validity of theory development in IB. To do so, we use case study research, which is a well-
established qualitative method for developing evidence-based theories that advance the – 
understanding of current global business scenario and existing knowledge of a given field 
(Yin, 1994, 2003). In particular, we analyze the world’s long-time delayed cross-border deal 
in telecommunications sector‒Vodafone-Hutchison deal‒that is connected with an Asian 
emerging market ‘India’. Regarding theory testing and development, we test 14 theories that 
have propounded in five management research forums, namely international economics, 
international business, strategic management, organization studies, and corporate finance. 
Therefore, based on shortcomings of the existing theories we develop or propose new theory 
‘Farmers Fox Theory’, which would improve the contemporary IB knowledge. Thus, our 
theory suggests that “a country’s weak institutional, regulatory, or legal framework would 
benefit both acquirer and target firm in a given international transaction; at the same time, 
this economic behaviour adversely affects its fiscal income, revenue or budget”. The 
following sections, for example, literature support, case analysis and theory testing will 
develop it in greater depth. In particular, most existing theories (studies) frequently explain 
(test) the given data during the post-entry of MNEs in a given economic setting while our 
theory describes at the foreign market entry-level. To the best of our knowledge, the concept 
or importance of constitutional laws is largely ignored in IB research. In other words, our 
theory significantly differs from, per se, institutional theory and liability of foreignness. 
Lastly, we offer some policy implications for a given country’s legal framework, and 
recommend some guidelines for multinational managers.  
The key economic terms, for instance, “liberalization” and “globalization” are 
anonymously indebted to the developed economies and their ideologists, economists and 
policy thinkers. In light of dramatic economic-policy transformation, this credit is also 
acknowledged to both the world finance institutions (e.g. World Bank, International 
Monetary Fund) and developed-economies multinational enterprises (DMNEs). In due 
course of time, foreign investment, technology, human capital and other intangible resources 
of DMNEs have predictably engulfed developing economies, and thereafter absorbed (or, 
learned) by the emerging-economies multinational enterprises (EMNEs) (Reddy et al., 
2013a; 2014b).2 In this inflow, the better inorganic-strategy of strategic management, and the 
                                                          
2 For instance, the annual consumption in emerging economies could increase from US$12 trillion to 
US$30 trillion, and occupy 70% of world economy growth by the year 2025 (McKinsey, 2012). 
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foreign market entry method of international business “cross-border merger/acquisition” 
option has become one of the EMNEs internationalization strategies (e.g. Peng, 2012; 
Ramamurti, 2012a, 2012b). By and large, a great amount of overseas investment crop up in 
the outward appearance of acquisitions (e.g. Becker and Fuest, 2010; Huizinga and Voget, 
2009). For example, number of global foreign mergers or acquisitions has been increased 
from 23% of total volume in 1998 to 45% in 2007 (Erel et al., 2012). In particular, number of 
deals (deal value) of word economy cross-border mergers and acquisitions3 (hereinafter, CB-
M&As) has increased from 1,582 (US$21.09 billion) in 1991 to 7,018 (US$1,022.72 billion) 
in 2007 at a massive growth rate 344% (4,748%), and thereafter sharply declined to 5,769 
(US$525.88 billion) in 2011 because of recent global financial crisis.4  Indeed, the main 
drivers of these CB-M&A waves are being globalization, technological innovation, bull 
financial market, deregulation and privatization (Goergen et al., 2005). 
Mergers and acquisitions are possibly the most aggressive strategic organizational 
response to resource dependence (Perez-Batres and Eden, 2008; Rugman and Hodgetts, 
1995; Weston et al., 1998). Indeed, foreign merger or acquisition is a potential mode of entry 
into a global market (Andersen, 1997). Of course, acquisitions provide a rapid means to get 
access to the local market, for example, access to distribution outlets (Kotabe and Helsen, 
2001: 304). Generally, a cross-border transaction takes place with the consent of at least two 
countries. Further, an acquisition involves the transfer of an asset between two owners of 
different countries who are taxed differently (see Becker and Fuest, 2010). In a transaction, if 
one country does not approve any of the terms explained in the given negotiation document, 
ultimately the deal is delayed, or is cancelled. Therefore, a country’s governance system, 
constitutional framework, legal environment, trust and relationship, and culture play a key 
role in international negations, and their ex-ante and ex-post accounting earnings (e.g. 
Barbopoulos et al., 2012; Blonigen, 1997; Feito-Ruiz and Menéndez-Requejo, 2011; 
Georgieva et al., 2012). To be sure, the concept of law and governance in the view of CB-
M&As, cross-border joint ventures, cross-country direct investments, international alliances, 
and multinational corporate ownership has extensively been investigated in (on) developed 
economies (e.g. Becker and Fuest, 2010; Erel et al., 2012; Kaplan, 1989; La Porta et al., 
2000, 2002; Pablo, 2009; Schöllhammer, 1971). For example, in Barbopoulos et al. (2012); 
Bris et al. (2008); Collins et al. (2009); di Giovanni (2005); Fang et al. (2004); Francis et al. 
(2008); Georgieva et al. (2012); Moeller and Schlingemann (2005); and Rossi and Volpin 
                                                          
3  Throughout this paper, the labels cross-border mergers and acquisitions, cross-country mergers and 
acquisitions, border-crossing mergers and acquisitions, and foreign mergers and acquisitions are used 
interchangeably.   
4 See UNCTAD (1992, 2008, 2012). 
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(2004), the authors show that legal framework, level of investor protection, cross-culture, 
corporate governance system, financial markets environment and quality of accounting 
standards are important factors while making deals triumphant, and the same factors could 
affect firm’s value and profitability. In addition, a country’s macroeconomic factors, such as, 
gross domestic product (GDP), tax system and tax incentives, exchange rate, and inflation 
rate likely to be influenced the border-crossing mergers or acquisitions (e.g. Hebous et al., 
2011; Lee, 2013; Pablo, 2009; Reddy, 2014; Reddy et al., 2014b; Scholes and Wolfson, 1990; 
Uddin and Boateng, 2011). More importantly, local political events could affect foreign 
direct investments for both the inbound and outbound flows (e.g. Ezeoha and Ogamba, 
2010; Schöllhammer and Nigh, 1984, 1986). In some instances, physical distance would play 
a role in international investments (Rose, 2000). 
Developing economies have benefited from the developed economies research 
outcome, insights, ideas, and recommendations in many areas of a country’s economic 
development, such as, deregulation, privatization, legal constitution, policy revolution, 
internationalization, and so forth of economic behaviors.5 However, many emerging markets 
(EMs) have failed to show a good governance system in several international trade activities, 
especially foreign direct investments (FDIs) and cross-border acquisitions. For instance, a 
well-reputed EM in Asian region, Indian government had been utterly failed to take an 
appropriate action in FDI proposals (e.g., retail market, telecom sector), and CB-M&A 
deals. 6  During 1970-1980, Indian economists who had trained in western universities 
amusingly implemented the 1991’s New Economic Policy reform for country’s balanced 
regional development.7 Thus, these policies have greatly encouraged DMNEs to invest in the 
country’s major thrust areas. In particular, a major percentage of policies has adopted from 
developed countries like U.S., UK, Germany, France, and Australia. Positively, most 
policies should require a great amount of amendments, but policy makers and politicians 
have ended up with minor adjustments. As a result, Vodafone and other multinational giants 
in different sectors from different nations has (have) badly experienced to the put forth of 
regulatory authorities’ peculiar guidelines. In fact, it is being a “stranger in a strange land” 
(see Eden and Miller, 2004). Thus, legal constituent of institutions or regulatory authorities 
                                                          
5 See the globalization and growth in emerging markets (Stiglitz, 2004), and the institutional environment 
in BRICs (Luo et al., 2011: 194). Also, see the shifts in economic activity and growth between and within 
regions of the world (Guth, 2009: 253–255).  
6 For instance, Nangia et al. (2011) show a delayed oil and petroleum deal between Vedanta and UK’s 
Cairn Energy. Reddy et al. (2012) show a broken telecom deal between Bharti Airtel and South Africa’s 
MTN. On the other hand, see the similarities in cross-national M&As of Chinese firms during 1985-2006 
(Yang and Hyland, 2012). 
7 See, for instance, Ahluwalia (2002), Bhole and Jitendra (2009), and Dongre (2012). 
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divulge strict controls in the form of policies, guidelines and rules that exist in the given 
economy (see Scott, 1995).  
With this in mind, we outline our objective, and contribution to the IB literature. 
Most Indian and international societies, such as, investment bankers, merger and acquisition 
advisors, legal advisory firms, tax consultants, policy makers, and academic community ‒ 
are thoroughly follow the India’s biggest cross-border telecom deal between Vodafone and 
Hutchison Whampoa, and Vodafone’s tax controversies with Union of India. Thus, 
Vodafone had faced worst cross-country tax litigations with Indian government for five years 
consecutively, 2007-2012. However, neither a finance researcher nor a law scholar has 
seriously investigated the Vodafone–Hutch deal with emphasis to international taxation and 
foreign investor protection. Therefore, our study would fulfill this important knowledge gap. 
We thus emphasize on tax litigation in cross-border deals that is attached with Indian 
government. In particular, we show India’s CB-M&A market during 2000-2011, case 
background, and case analysis and discussions. We then arrive at a conclusion that tax 
authorities action against Vodafone’s tax liability in light of withholding tax, and the 
retrospective policy announced in 2012 Budget framework ‒ are two important perturbed 
issues that would damage the country’s reputation and investor protection. Regarding theory 
testing and development, we test 14 theories propounded in five management research 
forums, for instance, eclectic paradigm (Dunning, 1977, 1980) and theory of FDI (Caves, 
1971; Hymer, 1970, 1976) in international economics, Uppsala theory of firm 
internationalization (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977, Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975) 
and theory of liability of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995) in IB, resource-based-view (RBV) theory 
(Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984) in strategic management, institutional theory (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977) in organization studies, and agency theory 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976) in corporate finance, just to mention a few. In addition, we 
examine two theorems or hypotheses suggested in earlier research relating to multinational 
corporate ownership structures, headquarters and subsidiary-firm relations, and so forth of 
cross-national corporate behaviors. With this consistence (based on shortcomings of the 
existing  IB theories), we develop a theory in light of regulatory framework – Farmers Fox 
Theory – for advances in IB knowledge and research. The selection of words ‘Farmers’ and 
‘Fox’ are stubborn, hence they are purposeful (similar to Dunning’s view, 1988). Further, we 
also offer some important propositions for new research. Lastly, we put forward some lawful 
proposals for improvement in the given country’s M&A regulatory system, and suggest some 
guidelines for multinational managers.  
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While utilizing the MNE context, “theory building is the one with the biggest 
potential impact on theory, yet is very rarely used. In that, IB research is missing huge 
opportunities to claim a major contribution not only to the IB field but also to management 
theory in general” (Bello and Kostova, 2012: 542). In this setting, our contribution to the IB 
literature is fourfold. First, we put more emphasis on case analysis in the view of 
international taxation that would add some insights from the emerging economies context, 
for instance, institutional view and liability of foreignness. Second, our counterpoints and 
discussions, and policy recommendations would help tax authorities and multinational 
managers, thus append imperative contribution to the literature on security laws, for 
instance, investor protection, corporate ownership structure and CB-M&As. Third, our 
approach of theory testing and aligning case illustrations would advance the methodological 
perspective of case-study research especially in IB literature. Fourth and finally, our new 
theory and propositions would show the directions for future research. In addition, teaching 
instructors and faculty of IB courses can teach, analyze and discuss the given case, thus 
would improve their teaching pedagogy while establishing a real business situation in a 
squared lecture theater. 
The remainder of the paper is set up as follows. Section 2 outlines the extensive 
literature on CB-M&As that study macroeconomic determinants and regulatory system. In 
Section 3, we explain the method that employed in this research paper. Section 4 shows 
India’s CB-M&As market and regulatory framework. Section 5 presents the case information 
that includes telecommunications market environment, profile of Vodafone and Hutchison 
Whampoa, and time-line of the deal. Section 6 discusses point and counterpoint of the given 
case. In Section 7, we test various business theories, and propose new theory and offer lawful 
propositions. Section 8 suggests policy guidelines, and concludes. 
 
2. Review of related literate on CB-M&As: A law and governance perspective 
Given the outstanding backdrop to the study, we have collected and reviewed the studies 
that ranging from a macroeconomic determinant to a firm-specific determinant of CB-
M&As.8 We therefore outline the review of literature in two schools. First, it presents the 
extensive contributions on various factors, which determine foreign investments and cross-
country acquisitions. Second, it draws a set of synopsis from the most relevant determinant 
of ‘taxation’ in foreign mergers investigations.        
2.1. Review of studies related to foreign investment and CB-M&A deals 
                                                          
8 See Hopkins (1999), Shimizu et al. (2004), and Slangen and Hennart (2007) for theoretical foundations, 
board literature review and different institutional perspectives of CB-M&As. Also, see Andersen (1997). 
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The research on ‘ownership structure of MNEs’ by Schöllhammer (1971) is a deep-seated 
setting to our paper.9 In his view, corporate structures create superior value to the firm when 
it has multinationalized. Thus, a global expansion strategy is likely to be appealed by two 
essential channels, namely FDIs and M&As. More importantly, both the channels influence 
[favorable/unfavorable] by numerous economic, political, legal and so forth of institutional 
factors. For instance, Root (1968 In Schöllhammer and Nigh, 1984) states that “market 
opportunity and political risk are the most influential factors in investment decisions”. 
Regarding the effect of political events on FDIs in Germany and Japan, Schöllhammer and 
Nigh (1984, 1986) observe that German firms invest in less advanced-economies; conversely, 
internal political conflicts in the host countries of the less advanced-world adversely affect 
foreign investments. On the other hand, intergovernmental networks or relationships, and 
relative weight of economic environment are important key factors in determining border-
crossing investments by Japanese firms.10 
La Porta et al. (2002) argue that strength [weakness] of an economic regulation or a 
legal framework would influence international investments. In other words, in Rossi and 
Volpin (2004), the authors suggest that mergers or acquisitions [volume] may increase and 
target firms improve their efficiency after merging with a company established in countries 
where a stronger investor protection offers. In fact, target firm usually adopts the accounting 
standards, disclosure practices, and governance structures of the acquiring firm (Bris et al., 
2008). Further, Bris et al. describe that when there is no formal change of the domestic legal 
system, firms in a country may adopt different levels of investor protection, depending on the 
firms they merge.11 Furthermore, in Bris and Cabolis (2008); Feito-Ruiz and Menéndez-
Requejo (2011); and Moeller and Schlingemann (2005), the authors indicate that acquiring 
firms pay a higher premium for targets from countries with a weak regulatory setting or less 
institutional environment because of significant asymmetric information and agency issues.  
In di Giovanni (2005: 145), the author examines CB-M&As dataset during 1990-
1999, finds that financial variables and other institutional factors play a crucial job in both 
inbound and outbound capital flows. Thus, size of financial markets is one of the 
determinants when a domestic enterprise invests or acquires a firm abroad. The author 
estimations indicate that a 1% rise of the stock market to GDP ratio is associated with a 
                                                          
9 Research by Schöllhammer (1971), study the different aspects of organization structure for 12 (4) MNEs 
located in the U.S. (European region). The author examines the structure of the relationships between the 
headquarters and its foreign operating units […] and organizational flexibility. 
10 While investigating the influence of political events on FDIs, the authors consider firm-specific factors, 
country-specific factors, industry-specific factors, and management-specific factors. 
11 See Bris et al. (2008) for exceptional contributions drew using a dataset of 15,000 CB-M&A deals (41 
economies and 39 industries) during 1990–2001. Also, see Kuipers et al. (2009). 
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0.955% increase in CB-M&As activity. In case of U.S. foreign acquisitions, bidding firms 
benefit from mergers or acquisitions take place in economies with a worse or weak financial 
markets regulatory setting (see Francis et al., 2008). In other words, Feito-Ruiz and 
Menéndez-Requejo (2011) investigate the impact of the legal and institutional setting on 
acquiring firm returns around the CB-M&A announcements. They notice that stronger the 
financial regulatory system, and therefore bidder firm shareholders should experience 
positive returns, or else, weak [negative].12 More recently, Barbopoulos et al. (2012: 1310) 
show that bidder firms of targets based in civil-law nations have outperformed to the deals 
based in common-law nations. Further, they suggest that buying a firm in economies where 
higher restrictions on capital mobility could add premium to the acquiring firm shareholders' 
wealth. 13  Similarly, Erel et al. (2012) suggest that geography or territory, quality of 
accounting disclosure and bilateral trade determinants rise the likelihood of M&As between 
two economies. They also mention that valuation is one of the key motives of foreign 
mergers, for instance, firms in countries whose capital market in terms of value and currency 
have augmented, and that has a significant market-to-book value tend to be acquirers, and 
targets otherwise.14 
In a related study, Georgieva et al. (2012) investigate the impact of country’s legal, 
cultural and business environment factors, industry factors as well as deal specific factors on 
the intensity of cross-border joint ventures. The authors suggest that U.S. firms are more 
likely to form joint ventures with firms from countries that have weak legal and regulatory 
setting.15 For banking mergers, Karolyi and Taboada (2011) show that acquirers are typically 
from countries with lesser regulations, stronger guidelines for foreign bank entry, lesser 
restrictions on bank activities, and with established deposit insurance schemes. They observe 
that severe laws of the banking sector in the target economy likely cause a decline in the 
number of foreign mergers or acquisitions.16 
In addition, Rose (2000 In Erel et al., 2012) mentions that physical distance could 
increase the cost of merger or combination. In other words, CB-M&A activities of Latin 
                                                          
12 See for fruitful implications of the investigation on 469 deals of European listed firms (221 CB-M&As 
and 248 local) between 2002 and 2006 (Feito-Ruiz and Menéndez-Requejo, 2011). 
13 For instance, the other important observations include bidder firms gain more from the acquisitions of 
targets situated in civil-law nations compared to … common-law nations (Barbopoulos et al., 2012). 
14 The authors examine the huge-dataset of 56,978 border-crossing M&A deals during 1990-2007 (Erel et 
al., 2012). Some of the key observations like “mergers are likely to happen between firms of economies 
that trade more commonly with one another” […]. 
15 The important observation is that “cross-border joint ventures are optimal, low cost organizational form 
mitigating information asymmetries, hold-up costs, and poor contract enforceability, especially in 
environment with larger market imperfections” (Georgieva et al., 2012: 777). 
16  See for fruitful findings from the cross-country banking-mergers research by Karolyi and Taboada 
(2011), use a significant dataset of 9,121 domestic and 2,486 cross-border deals during 1995-2008. 
12 
 
American region are positively affected by the economic freedom and business conditions in 
target country (see Pablo, 2009). Likewise, Uddin and Boateng (2011) examine the 
macroeconomic determinants of foreign acquisitions in UK market. They suggest that a 
country’s GDP, exchange rate and interest rate are likely to influence a local enterprise while 
buying a firm in other economies. More specifically, Blonigen (1997 In Lee, 2013) explores a 
link between exchange rates and FDIs. The author develops a model where the assets 
acquired in an acquisition are easily moveable within the firm, thus able to produce returns 
in any currency. Indeed, a currency movements is one the important determinants of foreign 
M&As (Erel et al., 2012). Lee (2013) examines five of the top investing countries [Australia, 
Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States] for CB-M&As during 1989-
2007. The author shows that exchange rate is one of the key determinants for inbound-FDI 
to the U.S. economy but not for inbound-FDI to other developed markets. On the other 
hand, culture is one of the determinants of border-crossing investments or acquisitions. Fang 
et al. (2004) examine the merger of Telia–Telenor failure case; they observe that historical 
sentiments, feelings and emotions are some of the significant variables that would damage 
cross-cultural business models [if ignored]. Likewise, Collins et al. (2009) show that cultural 
distance between two countries and political uncertainty has linked inversely with cross-
border acquisitions.  
In sum, we argue that a nation’s macroeconomic factors, for instance, GDP, 
exchange rate, bilateral trade relations and interest rate; and financial system and regulatory 
setting issues, for example, level of investor protection and quality of accounting standards – 
would influence border-crossing mergers or acquisitions. Further, we also realize that 
political events and governmental relationships play a vital job in FDI inflows (outflows).   
2.2. Review of studies related to Taxation as a determinant in CB-M&A deals 
In Petruzzi (1988: 109), the author states that taxation is likely a motive for merger 
waves, in which suggests a model of shareholder behavior under the principles of double 
taxation. The author advocates that a tax should impose on mergers while taxing dividend 
income.17 In addition to the case of political stability, the established tax system is one of the 
key factors that make a nation investment friendly or hostile (Ezeoha and Ogamba, 2010: 8). 
Indeed, most economics, finance and accounting scholars show that legal environment is the 
most important determinant of cross-country deals, like alliances, joint ventures, mergers, 
acquisitions and takeovers. Of course, some school of scholars explains that ‘tax advantage’ 
                                                          
17 See the empirical evidence and discussions on dividends and taxes (Miller and Scholes, 1982).  
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is one of the major motives behind these deals.18  By contrast, the aforesaid schools of 
researchers show that a country’s financial markets legal infrastructure, banking guidelines, 
taxation issues and political events would adversely affect these deals, especially global direct 
investments and foreign acquisitions (e.g. Bris et al., 2008; Erel et al., 2012; Pablo, 2009; 
Reddy et al., 2013b; Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Schöllhammer and Nigh, 1984, 1986).  
More specifically, accounting researchers find that foreign acquisitions and alliances 
do an act of ‘tax evasion’ (e.g. Kourdoumpalou and Karagiorgos, 2012). In this setting, we 
pose a fundamental research question in line with Collins et al. (1995), Kaplan (1989), and 
Scholes and Wolfson (1990), does taxation affect merger or acquisition transactions? The 
authors suggest “because of structured tax reform there is a great deal of rise in tax burden 
while taking over a firm where the other one has foreign tax credit in its local environment”. 
More recently, Becker and Fuest (2010) study the optimal repatriation tax framework in an 
event where capital involves a change of ownership. They suggest that tax subsidies or 
exemption schemes are constructive if ownership advantage is a public good within the 
foreign MNE. As of Nigeria case, Ezeoha and Ogamba (2010) ascertain that multiple tax 
schemes reduce incentives to pay tax or for voluntary compliance; in an adverse manner, the 
current Nigerian system does not motivate taxpayers while inducing voluntary compliance. 
However, when we look over different countries taxation structures there are two 
types of tax systems, such as, single taxation and double taxation, in which a given country 
normally levy on foreign transactions that include investments and mergers. Hence, if a 
country has free trade agreement (FTA) or any other special agreement with other country, 
the then single tax applies, or else double taxation. Though, it depends on the country’s 
existing tax structure and guidelines. According to the theory, research by Huizinga and 
Voget (2009) describe that double taxation comes in the form of nonresident dividend 
withholding taxes, and parent country corporate income’ taxation of repatriated dividends. 
They suggest that foreign country tax schemes greatly influence the outcome of border-
crossing acquisitions. In other words, the parent-subsidiary investment establishing a firm 
supported by foreign acquisition is greatly affected by the double taxation. The authors also 
state that the likelihood of parent firm location in a country following a foreign takeover is 
abridged by high double taxation of border-crossing source income.19 Similarly, Hebous et 
                                                          
18 For instance, Trautwein (1990) classifies the theories of merger motives. They are [1] mergers benefit 
bidder shareholders (net gains through synergies ‒ Efficiency theory; wealth transfers from customers ‒ 
Monopoly theory; wealth transfers from target shareholders ‒ Raider theory; net gains through private 
information ‒ Valuation theory); [2] mergers benefits managers ‒ Empire-building theory; [3] mergers as 
process of outcome ‒ Process theory; and [4] mergers as macroeconomic phenomenon ‒ Disturbance theory. 
19 In other words, economies that levy high international double-taxation rates are less likely appeal the 
parent firms of newly established MNEs (Huizinga and Voget, 2009: 1244). 
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al. (2011) examine the impact of differences in cross-border tax rates with respect to the 
location for a subsidiary of MNE. They show that location decisions of M&A investments 
have less influenced to differences in tax rates compared to location decisions of Greenfield 
investments.  
On the other hand, tax evasions would adversely affect fiscal or government revenue 
that obstructs the timely implementation of economic policies and programs. More notably, 
Erel et al. (2012: 1059) find that larger differences in corporate income tax rates attract 
foreign investment. In Kourdoumpalou and Karagiorgos (2012), the authors investigate the 
affect of corporate tax evasion doings on the investor protection and the capital market 
functioning during 1992‒2006. They find the mean rate of tax evasion is about 16%, which 
infers that the incentives for tax evasion do not reduce when the firms are publicly listed.  
In sum, we have come to know various motives behind taxation, types of taxation in 
foreign acquisitions, and the impact of double taxation on international investments’ from 
different studies that performed in different institutional settings. More importantly, we draw 
a fact that ‘a country’s tax policies, tax structure, and tax incentives and schemes’ play a 
major role in border-crossing merger or acquisition deals. By contrast, we strongly contend 
that tax evasion would be more where there is a book law of double taxation or high 
international tax rates. 
Lastly, when we summarize the aforementioned literature of two schools many 
insights and implications have epitomized to support our select cross-country telecom deal 
between Vodafone and Hutchison, and to counterpart various arguments in case analysis. In 
addition, the observations arrived at studies from diverse economic frameworks related to 
foreign acquisitions have assisted us while offering a large amount of valid policy 
implications for benefiting different stakeholders. Moreover, these reviews assist us while 
performing following actions like theory testing, and theory development and propositions.     
 
3. Method: Case study research 
It is worth mentioning that matching the methodology to the research question is central to 
any research effort (Punch, 1998 In Nicholson and Kiel, 2007). For instance, “qualitative 
research allows the researcher to discover new variables and relationships, to reveal and 
understand complex processes, and to illustrate the influence of the social context” (Shah 
and Corley, 2006: 1824). Indeed, when researchers perform the given job rigorously, and 
reported clearly and concisely, thus qualitative method is a powerful tool for management 
researchers that provides a great deal of merits beyond what traditional survey methods can 
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provide (Shah and Corley, 2006: 1830).20 Given the purpose and the type of synopsis of our 
study in international business, we have chosen a well-established qualitative method “Case 
Study Research” (CSR). Conceptually, purpose of CSR is to build theories from an event 
that has associated with person, organization, animal, etc. (Yin, 1994, 2003). Yin defines 
that “a case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context 
are not clear evident, and it relies on multiple sources of evidence” (Yin, 1994: 13).21,22,23 
Thus, CSR provides extensive yet important interpretations regardless of limitations: 
standardization and generalization of findings (Larsson and Lubatkin, 2001).     
It is worth stating that IB discipline is one of the youngest and fastest growing 
academic forums in business administration research (e.g. Aharoni and Brock, 2010; Seno-
Alday, 2010). As a group of researchers, it is our job to bring what an ‘Academy of 
International Business’s (AIB) perception towards qualitative research and its greater 
advantage in IB research. As far as qualitative research is concerned, theory testing is a great 
deal of contribution that improves the quality of a given field, which supports empirical 
studies especially in management research (see Doz, 2011; Miller and Tsang, 2011, Shah 
and Corley, 2006). In Birkinshaw et al. (2011: 573), the authors suggest that “thick 
description, exploratory research, and comparative case analysis that focus on inductive 
theory building and hypotheses generation may be more suitable for significant advances in 
IB research”. In fact, the biggest contributions come from bold, novel theory-building efforts 
that push the research frontiers by fully utilizing the theoretically unique context of IB (Bello 
and Kostova, 2012: 543). 24  In light of CSR, Welch et al. (2011) design a typology of 
                                                          
20 Also, see techniques to ensure the trustworthiness of qualitative research (Shah and Corley, 2006: 1830). 
21  Historically, CSR method has developed and practiced as a regular research paradigm in medical 
sciences, and political and social sciences. In a dramatic transformation of knowledge and technology, and 
culture adaptation, CSR has borrowed and validated in business administration fields like marketing, 
strategy, operations and international business, among others. Thus, CSR aims to test theories that require 
the specification of theoretical propositions derived from an existing theory (as cited in Darke et al., 1998: 
275). More specifically, Whetten (1989: 490) suggests that two criteria exist for judging the extent of 
theory, namely comprehensiveness and parsimony. Conversely, an important rationale of theory testing is 
to explore how far its anticipated means are consistent with observable events (Sayer, 1992 In Tsang, 
2006). Finally, theory building requires the rich knowledge while theory testing is a cornerstone of the 
scientific method; however, theory development and refinement are of equal importance (as cited In Shah 
and Corley, 2006: 1822). 
22 Also, see Burgelman (2009), Doty and Glick (1994), Dubin (1978), Guba and Lincoln (1994), Ridder et 
al. (forthcoming), and Van Maanen (1979).  
23 Good theory is one that will be practically useful in the course of daily events, not only to social 
scientists, but also to laymen’ (Locke, 2001 In Shah and Corley, 2006). 
24 Hence, the inherent complexity of IB phenomena could investigate through interdisciplinary research, 
valid applications, thus integrate and mix ideas and methods from two or more disciplines (Bello and 
Kostova, 2012: 541). 
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theorizing that suggests four forms, namely contextualized explanation, inductive theory-
building, interpretive sense-making, and natural experiment.25 
Prior to use CSR approach in our study, we ask ourselves – are there any studies in 
the past or in the recent that have used CSR as a pragmatic method in IB research and other 
forums. Certainly, we found a number of studies that have used CSR for different purposes, 
for instance, testing the existing theories/models (Nicholson and Kiel, 2007),26 testing the 
existing propositions/hypotheses (Kshetri and Dholakia, 2009), building theories/models 
(Boehe, 2011; Lynes and Andrachuk, 2008; Tsamenyi et al., forthcoming), developing 
propositions or hypotheses, or both (Huang et al., 2008; Lubatkin, 1983)27, and other ideas 
(Jonsson and Foss, 2011).28 More specifically, Tsang (2006: 1000) distinguishes between two 
ways of theory testing, namely assumption-omitted and assumption-based, further 
recommends that when a new theory is initially tested, the latter should play a more 
important role than the former.29 More recently, Tsang (forthcoming) proposes that when the 
emphasis on theory development is strong and the emphasis on contextualization is weak 
there would be stronger “theory building and testing”. 
Thus, our paper falls into three categories, namely testing the existing theories, 
developing theory, and offering propositions. To do so, we have chosen single case study, 
and compare and discuss the similarities of this case with other two cases that have 
associated with the given economic setting. In fact, Yin (1994) suggests that a CSR can be 
used on single case or multiple cases that varies from researcher to researcher, because it 
depends on the purpose of research whether theory is testing or theory is developing. Hence, 
single case is suitable when it satisfy all the guidelines for theory(ies) testing, or developing 
new ideas or theories (Dyer and Wilkins, 1991, Ghauri, 2004; Siggelkow, 2007; Yin, 2003). 
Of course, there are abundant and diverse theories on mergers and acquisitions that 
have developed in economics, finance, organization, strategy, and international business. To 
fulfill our objective, we test 14 theories that have developed in different management 
research forums. In other words, eclectic paradigm and theory of FDI in international 
                                                          
25 However, there are some arguments that explain cleverly by Tsang (forthcoming).  
26 In corporate governance forum, the authors have tested business theories like agency theory, stewardship 
theory and resource dependence theory. They find that no single theory explains the general pattern of 
results in a given setting. 
27 In particular, Lubatkin (1983) has suggested two novel propositions based on previous empirical studies. 
First, “mergers do not provide real benefits, because managers make mistakes […] second, mergers do 
provide real benefits, because administrative problems […]. 
28 Jonsson and Foss (2011) use a longitudinal in-depth study that comprises 70 interviews of Swedish home 
furnishing giant IKEA involving more than 70 interviews. 
29 More specifically, assumption-based testing serves three important functions: identifying problematic 
areas of a theory, opening up new opportunities for strengthening a theory, and clarifying the conceptual 
domain of an assumption (Tsang, 2006: 1006). 
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economics, theory of firm internationalization and theory of liability of foreignness in 
international business, RBV theory in strategic management, institutional theory in 
organization studies, and agency theory in corporate finance. In addition, we test two 
theorems that have suggested in earlier research relating to multinational corporate 
ownership structures, learning-by-doing, headquarters and subsidiary-firm relations, and so 
forth of cross-national corporate behaviors. 
Regarding data, we have chosen a method of archival data (see my paper, Reddy, 
2015a). Thus, archival data can be used independently as well, particularly when attempting 
to understand historical incidents, or economic or social systems […] archival data often take 
a supporting role to interviews and observation in management research (Shah and Corley, 
2006: 1829). The sources of our data are as follows.30 The deal information and the court(s) 
rulings are collected from India’s registered national finance dailies, namely The Economic 
Times, The Hindu Business Line, Business Standard and The Financial Express, and finance and 
legal consultants like BMR Advisors, Deloitte, and KPMG.31 More importantly, we accumulate 
the essence of the given case, and business profile and financial information from the 
respective ‘Company Annual Reports’. We also support internationally reputed consultants’ 
opinions refer to Grant Thornton and McKinsey. 
In sum, a qualitative method ‘CSR’ is employed in our study to test existing theories, 
and to develop new theory “Farmers Fox Theory” whilst providing some important 
propositions for advances in existing IB knowledge. 
 
4. India’s CB-M&As market and regulatory framework 
With the extensive literature backdrop and the inputs of a given CSR method in IB 
research, we therefore unfold this section into two parts. First, we show India’s CB-M&As 
trend during 2000‒2011. Second, we present the existing M&As regulatory framework.  
By 2006, FDI (stock) including M&As from developing world had reached US$174 
billion that is equal to 14% of the world's total in which emerging markets have 13% share 
(US$1.6 trillion) (see Economist, 2008). Over the world economy, the year 2007 is the 
tremendous spectrum for CB-M&A deals, thus evidenced in emerging economies (see 
                                                          
30 While collecting secondary data, we have followed a few guidelines suggested by Reddy and Agrawal 
(2012). 
31  Further, registered business magazines, like Businessworld, Business today, Outlook Business, and legal 
editorials include Taxmann’s Corporate Laws and Indian Lawyer; thus together have assisted us greatly while 
understanding the given case, and knowing the fundamentals of a given country’s financial system and its 
legal framework. In addition, we absorb information for various reasons from a choice of faithful websites, 
namely livemint.com, Indiainfoline database, and Reuters. 
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UNCTAD, 2008).32  In its survey, Grant Thornton International Business Report (2011) 
indicate that firms in emerging economies could evidence more profitability prospects, for 
example, Vietnam (90%) followed by India (79%) …, and Brazil (66%).33 
4.1. India’s CB-M&A market during 2000‒2011 
We provide some highlights of India’s foreign acquisition transactions in terms of 
purchases and sales for the period 2000‒2011 (see Figure 1). Apart from the basic outline of 
a given chart, we shall express few interesting observations. When look at India’s CB-M&As 
numerical, one can understand that foreign acquisitions in terms of sales (number of deals 
and deal value) have been increased significantly compared to purchases (same as aforesaid) 
during the past 12 years. In fact, one can also observe that the year 2007 has shown a great 
amount of investment-flow, for example, purchases are appreciably higher than sales. From 
this finding, we infer that both Indian local companies and MNEs have internationalized 
their operations through foreign mergers or acquisitions since 2005. At the same time, 
DMNEs have been taken-over local firms majorly through FDIs and substantial acquisition 
of shares. In this regard, we argue that “this is possible because the Indian government had 
amended many regulations including FDI norms under FIPB authority during 2005‒2006”. 
The other important findings are as follows. For the 12-year period, total number of deals 
(deal value) for purchases and sales has reached 1,122 (US$47.97 billion), and 1,052 
(US88.93 billion), respectively. Conversely, averages likely show for purchases (number of 
deals 87.67; deal value US$7,410 million), and sales (same as aforesaid, 93.5; US$4,000 
million). Therefore, this noteworthy finding infers that most domestic firms have preferred 
merger or acquisition as one of their corporate strategies both for internationalizing their 
trade and for gaining ownership advantages (e.g. Ramamurti, 2012a). In this exemplar, one 
can test the Dunning’s eclectic paradigm (Dunning, 1977, 2000), or the Uppsala theory of 
firm internationalization (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977) that would add significant 
contribution from emerging economies setting to the existing IB literature. Similarly, 
outbound acquisitions average growth rate is significantly higher than inbound acquisitions. 
For instance, we have seen ample of rise in purchases (number of deals 38%; deal value 
1030%) compared to sales (same as aforesaid, 16%; 80%). More importantly, we observe 
similar findings when Indian share is measured as a percentage of world economy. In other 
words, purchases in terms of number of deals as a percentage of world economy are notably 
higher than sales for the period 2005‒2008 and 2010. Indeed, we do not find significant 
                                                          
32 See the fruitful discussions on CB-M&As around the year 2007 (Capaldo et al., 2008). Also, refer to a 
recent investigation by Kohli and Mann (2012) for determinants of value creation in India’s domestic (66 
deals) and cross border acquisitions (202 deals) during 1997‒2008.  
33 Also, see Grant Thornton International Business Report (2012). 
19 
 
difference between purchases and sales. However, purchases in terms of deal value as a 
percentage of world economy are higher than sales (1.40 > 0.87). 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
It is worth mentioning that emerging-economy firms have acquired many local firms 
in developed economies during the global financial crises (see the period 2007‒2010). 
Nevertheless, it is because of lower valuations, less number of counter bidders, down in 
corporate earnings of different industries and tough-time for local firms to obtain debt capital 
in developed markets like U.S., UK and other European countries, the then, these countries 
have most affected by the recent financial crises. Additionally, Grant Thornton and 
ASSOCHAM Report (2012: 13-14) shows that total Indian M&As value (number of deals) 
has reached US$62 billion (971 deals) in 2010, US$54 billion (1,026 deals) in 2011, and the 
first four months of 2012 shows US$23 billion (396 deals). Thus, altogether infer that the 
desire of local entrepreneurs is to bring in advanced technology and equity to boost various 
business opportunities (also, see Reddy, 2015b). 
 
4.2. The M&As regulatory framework 
With this in mind, we present India’s M&A regulatory framework (see Appendix A). 
It comprises five government authorities, namely the Registrar of Companies (Companies 
Act, 1956), the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI – SAS&T Regulations, 1997), 
the Competition Commission of India (CCI ‒ Competition Act, 2002), the Reserve Bank of 
India (RBI), and the Department of Revenue (Income Tax Act, 1961).34 In particular, RBI 
plays a key role in banking and finance related mergers, alliances or combinations. Apart 
from the above controllers, the Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB) performs an 
important role in FDI approvals and foreign trade transactions. Prior to the FIPB (1950‒80, 
per se), the policy setting was featured by the widespread bureaucratic control over choices 
and decisions; in fact, licensing was one of the instruments used to corroborate private 
investment at both inbound and outbound (see Agarwal and Bhattacharjea, 2006).35 There 
are some other acts, which perform directly and indirectly related to both domestic and 
foreign deals. For instance, the acts like Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999; Indian 
Stamp Act, 1899; Registration Act, 1908; Transfer of Property Act, 1882; Wealth Tax Act, 
1957; and Customs Act, 1962.36 Most of these regulations are exercised by the Department 
of Revenue [under the Ministry of Finance].37          
                                                          
34 See the legal aspects of M&As for Indian business environment (Ray, 2010: 647–703). 
35 Also, see Ramakrishnan (2010) and Venkiteswaran (1993). 
36 For example, the Indian Stamp Act 1899 is a regulation laying down the law relating to tax levied in the 
form of stamps on instruments recording transactions. On the other hand, the parliament has enacted the 
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5. Case information 
With this in mind, we present our case details. For transparency and authenticity, 
this section has formally partitioned into two sub-sections. First, it discusses the international 
telecom market environment. Second, we present the profile of Vodafone and Hutchison 
Whampoa.  
5.1. International telecommunications market environment 
In Li and Whalley (2002), the authors mention that the waves of liberalization and 
privatization have raised primarily in developed markets, for instance, it began in the U.S. 
(1980s, per se), followed by the European region (e.g., UK, Germany) and Japan for 
disparate economic and political reasons.38 However, in the early 1990s more players that 
are hostile entered the market that made a significant impact on the telecommunications 
industry (Li and Whalley, 2002: p. 454).39  In fact, this policy regime and deregulation 
paradigm has significantly changed the face of many industries in world economy, for 
example, logistics and transportation, telecommunications, banking and financial services, 
and so forth. By the year 2000, most economies have deregulated their telecomm market. As 
a result, competition has escalated, new technologies and services have developed, prices 
have decreased, and consequently mobile telecommunications have reached a larger part of 
the universe (Whalley and Curwen, 2012a).  
In Böhme et al. (2008), the authors mention that there is a great improvement in 
Asian economies because of strong fundamentals of both the stock and banking markets. 
They also argue that these nations have become target for foreign players in due course of 
integration, connection or experience with world financial system. In other words, telecom 
sector is the one that has been deregulated since 1994 for many reasons like FDIs, licensing, 
spectrum allocation, etc (Jain et al., 2005). More importantly, DMNEs in telecom sector 
have been internationalizing their core-activities through various corporate strategies in 
developing, emerging and bottom-of-the-pyramid (BOP) countries. In fact, telecom DMNEs 
and EMNEs internationalization strategies are significantly different within the industry 
compared to other product or service based industries (see Curwen and Whalley, 2006; 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 to replace the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973. The 
object of the Act is to manage and amend the law relating to foreign exchange with objective of facilitating 
external trade. 
37 See the India’s legal framework related to business and business enterprises (Gulshan, 2009; Tulsian, 
2000). 
38 In Schöllhammer and Nigh (1984), the authors mention, “since the mid 1960's the highest relative raise 
in their degree of internationalization has been accomplished by firms based in the Germany and Japan, 
while during the 1950's and early 1960's U.S. based firms held the top position. 
39 Also, see Curwen and Whalley (2005). 
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Whalley and Curwen, 2005).40 Certainly, India is one of those countries that have initiated 
parallel to the European markets (Curwen and Whalley, 2005). The telecommunications 
sector is one of the important drivers of the India’s infrastructure development program; as a 
result, many DMNEs have invited to establish their units in India. For instance, number of 
wireless connections has exponentially increased from 6.54 million in 2002 to 893.84 million 
in 2011 at a massive growth rate 13,567% (see Appendix B). Indeed, Hutchison Whampoa 
and Vodafone are biggest players in this industry. Both the MNEs are ‘Flagship firms’, 
which co-ordinate the investment and operational activities of other companies within their 
business network (Whalley, 2004). With this in mind, we therefore present the profile of 
both the global telecom giants.   
 
5.2. Company information 
5.2.1. Profile of Vodafone Group Plc 
The UK-based Vodafone Group is a multinational telecom enterprise operating 
across the world economy offering a range of communications products and services. The 
products or services include voice, messaging, data and fixed-line solutions, and instruments 
to assist customers in meeting their total communications needs (see VGP-AR, 2012). 
According to the Financial Times Global 500 ranking for the year 2012, it has ranked 36th 
declined from 30th in 2011. Further, it is next to China’s China Mobile in the worldwide 
telecommunications industry.41 The company has established as a Racal Telecom in 1982 
and become an independent listed firm in 1991. In other words, it had separated from Racal 
Electronics in 1991 and merged with AirTouch Communications, the then became a new 
entity ‘Vodafone AirTouch’ in 1999. Following the year 2000, Vodafone started as a group 
enterprise headquartered in Newbury, England (see Infocom-de.com). It operates in three 
geographic markets, namely Europe, Africa and Central Europe, Asia Pacific and the 
Middle East, thus has a significant equity interest in the U.S. based Verizon Wireless (see 
in.reuters.com). By and large, the company’s global presence in terms of number of markets 
(number of mobile customers) has increased dramatically at three-fold (35-fold) from 12 (5.8 
million) in 1998 to 38 (206.4 million) in 2007, and thereafter, augmented to 40 (370.9 
million) in 2011 (see VGP-AR, 2006, 2007, 2011). It is listed primarily on the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) in 1988 and the second listing on NASDAQ. As of May 16, 2011, it had a 
market capitalization approximately £86.4 billion making is the second largest listing in the 
                                                          
40 In addition, see Curwen and Whalley (2008), and Pogrebnyakov and Maitland (2011) for strategic 
challenges in the world economy while internationalizing the telecom firms. Also, see the international 
diversification and service firm performance (Capar and Kotabe, 2003). 
41 Source: Financial Times (2012). 
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Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) 100 index, and the 28th largest MNE in the world 
measured by market capitalization (VGP-AR, 2011: 134). In 2000, it has acquired 
Germany’s Mannesmann for US$231 billion, which is the biggest deal in Vodafone’s 
corporate history (Tele.net.in, 2007). Since the early 1990s, Vodafone has expanded 
internationally to become the world’s largest mobile telecommunications company; for 
instance, it has launched 3G services in Europe in 2004. Because of internationalization, it 
has acquired a great deal of potential in 11 out of the 15 European Union (EU) member 
countries (see Whalley, 2004).42  In 2006, it has sold its Japanese unit to Softbank and 
Swedish unit to Telenor. (In the outstanding part of this section, we describe the current case 
Vodafone – Hutchison telecom deal.) In November, 2011, it has sold 24.4% equity interest in 
Poland’s Polkomtel; more recently, its Netherlands-based firm, Vodafone Libertel BV has 
acquired Telespectrum-DJ in April 2012 (see in.reuters.com).43 In the limelight of company 
financials, the group has shown impressive results during 2008-2012. For instance, total 
revenue (profit) has improved (recovered) appreciably from £26.68 billion (£6.52 billion) in 
2005 to £29.35 billion (−£21.82 billion) in 2006, £31.1 billion (−£5.3 billion) in 2007, £45.9 
billion (£7.87 billion) in 2011, and £46.47 billion (£7 billion) in 2012 (see VGP-AR, 2006, 
2007, 2011, 2012). 
Regarding Indian operations, Vodafone has acquired an additional 22% equity stake 
in Vodafone India Limited44 (VIL) from its joint venture partner ‘Essar Group’ for £2.6 
billion on July 1, 2011 (VGP-AR, 2012: 56). Further, Essar Group has sold their remaining 
11% equity interest in VIL to Piramal Healthcare for £767 million during the financial year 
2011-2012. As of March 31, 2012, Vodafone had a 64.4% interest in VIL through its wholly 
owned subsidiaries, and a further 20.1% indirect holding giving an aggregate 84.5% equity 
interest or capital control (VGP-AR, 2012: 118).       
5.2.2. Profile of Hutchison Whampoa Limited 
The Hong Kong based and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange listed MNE’ Hutchison 
Whampoa Limited (HWL) is a conglomerate and an investment holding group. According 
to the Financial Times Global 500 ranking, it has ranked 150th for the year 2011, and then 
down to 167 in 2012; further, it ranks fifth in sector ranking of ‘General Industrials’.45 The 
multinational business entrepreneur Li Ka-shing’ owned Cheung Kong Holdings has equity 
                                                          
42 See for Vodafone in the worldwide operators’ presence in number of countries (Curwen and Whalley, 
forthcoming). 
43 See the internationalization sequence of Vodafone in BOP-markets (Schuster and Holtbrügge, 2012: 
823–825). Also, see Appendix B in our paper for Vodafone share in Indian telecommunications market. 
44 On October 11, 2011, the firm name (VIL) has changed from a joint venture called Vodafone-Essar 
Limited (VEL). 
45 Source: Financial Times (2012). 
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interest of 49.9% in HWL; in fact, he solely chairs both the firms (Whalley and Curwen, 
2012b). HWL business operations include property and hotels, ports and related services, 
energy, infrastructure, retail, finance and investments, and telecommunications, as well. It is 
also a container terminal operator (see in.reuters.com). As of December 31, 2011, it held 
interests in 52 ports internationally, which include 269 berths in 26 countries together with 
container terminals (see HWL-AR, 2011). In truth, a role model for Asian emerging 
enterprises has continuously been diversifying its services into new markets (e.g. Whalley 
and Curwen, 2012b). It develops and invests in real estate projects, ranging from office 
buildings to residential properties. Further, HWL’s diverse retail portfolio comprises health 
and beauty products, luxury perfumeries and cosmetics, supermarkets, consumer electronics 
and electrical appliances, and airport retailing. In addition, it invests in energy and 
infrastructure projects that are located in Hong Kong, the U.K., the Mainland, Australia, 
New Zealand, Canada, Greenland and Indonesia (see in.reuters.com).46 In the limelight of 
company financials, the HWL results are worth mentioning during 2002-2011. For example, 
total revenue (profit, total assets) has boosted substantially from HK$75.24 billion 
(HK$11.77 billion, HK$498.44 billion) in 2002 to HK$218.68 billion (HK$33.35 billion, 
HK$790.34 billion) in 2007, and HK$233.7 billion (HK$56 billion, HK$720.54 billion(↓)) in 
2011 (see HWL-AR, 2011).47     
The HWL operates and holds different amounts of equity interest in different 
countries, which is a complex structure while it is being a standard practice of any MNE (see 
Figure 2). Its subsidiary-firm Hutchison Telecommunications International Limited (HTIL) 
was floated in 2004 to carry out a set of fixed-wire and mobile assets in eight countries, 
namely Hong Kong, India, Israel, Macau, Sri Lanka, Ghana, Paraguay and Thailand (as 
cited In Whalley and Curwen, 2012b: 20). Nevertheless, it appears that HTIL reported 
profits of almost HK$67 billion in 2007 although this is primarily due to the sale of the 
company's operations in India to Vodafone for HK$69.3 billion (HWL-AR, 2008 In Whalley 
and Curwen, 2012b: 29). The authors Whalley and Curwen argue that HTIL could have 
represented loss in 2007 when no sale of its 100% equity interest in Cayman Islands based 
CGP Investments (Holdings) Limited to Vodafone. It is worth noting that HTIL has 
invested roughly US$2.6 billion in India since 1995 (Tele.net.in, 2007). In this regard, one 
can estimate that Li Ka-shing has outstandingly gained about US$8.3 billion for the period 
of stay 1995‒2006 [per se]. 
                                                          
46 See the historical performance of Hutchison Whampoa in the European telecom market (Whalley and 
Curwen, 2006: 629-631). 
47 Also, see HWL-AR (2009, 2010). 
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[Insert Figure 2 here] 
In reality, the Indian-listed entity Hutch-Essar Limited (HEL) is a joint venture 
between CGP Investments (Holdings) Limited, which is indirectly owned by the HTIL and 
the Indian conglomerate firm Essar Group. In 1995, the Hutchison was launched its mobile 
operations, and able to become the market leader in the Mumbai ‘circle’ by the end of 1996 
with more than 50,000 subscribers (as cited In Whalley and Curwen, 2012b).48 Subsequently, 
the acquisitions of other mobile operators gained the territory market advantage of 
Hutchison Max. In January 2006, it had acquired BPL Mobile Cellular which, when 
combined with the pending purchases of BPL Mobile Communications and Essar Spacetel, 
would expand the company's footprint in India to 23 circles (Whalley and Curwen, 2012b: 
23–24).  
5.3. Time-line of the Vodafone–Hutchison deal 
As of previously mentioned, Vodafone-Hutchison cross-country telecom deal is one 
of the world’s longtime-delayed border-crossing mergers and acquisitions (see Figure 3 and 
Box 1). As far as the case is concerned, Vodafone Group Plc is Britain's diversified telecom 
MNE, which has an offshore subsidiary unit Vodafone International Holdings B.V (VIH) 
located in the Netherlands. On the other hand, HWL is Hong Kong’s largest conglomerated 
MNE, which has an on-shore Asian subsidiary firm HTIL headquartered in Hong Kong; 
thus HTIL has 100% equity holdings in CGP Investments (Holdings) Limited located in 
Cayman Islands. Indeed, both MNEs have significant equity interest in their respective 
subsidiaries. The key point of the case is that “CGP owns a 51.95% indirect shareholding in 
HEL, an Indian-listed entity (VGP-AR, 2007).49 The crux of the case is that “Vodafone had 
agreed (completed) on February 11 (May 8), 2007 to buy a HTIL’s 100% holdings in CGP 
Investments through its subsidiary firm VIH for US$10.9 billion (see VGP-AR, 2007, 
2008). 50  Certainly, there was some debt amount approximately US$2 billion that has 
included in the deal amount (Tele.net.in, 2007).51 Consequently, the acquisition has resulted 
in Vodafone’s control over CGP and its subsidiaries including HEL (see BMR, 2012). More 
                                                          
48  During 1998, Hutchison increased its stake in the Indian mobile business – Hutchison Max 
Telecommunications – to 49.5%, and subscribed to the preference shares of another company holding a 
large stake in Hutchison Max (as cited In Whalley and Curwen, 2012b: 23). 
49 As part of its acquisition of CGP, Vodafone acquired a less than 50% equity interest in Telecom 
Investments India Private Limited (“TII”) and in Omega Telecom Holdings Private Limited (“Omega”), 
which in turn has a 19.54% and 5.11% indirect shareholding in Hutchison Essar. Concurrently with the 
acquisition of CGP, the Vodafone granted put options exercisable between 8 May 2010 and 8 May 2011 to 
members of the Essar group of companies that will allow the Essar group to sell its 33% shareholding in 
HEL to the Group for US$5 billion or to sell between US$1 billion and US$5 billion worth of HEL shares 
to the Group at an independently appraised fair market value (VGP-AR, 2007: 136–137). 
50 Also, see HWL-AR (2007). 
51 Also, see India Knowledge@Wharton (2007). 
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surprisingly, the Indian tax authorities had argued that the underlying or principal asset 
transferred pursuant to the deal was a ‘controlling stake’ in HEL, which was indirectly held 
by the HTIL. In other words, the revenue department had issued a notice to Vodafone, 
inducing it as an assesse-in-default for failure to withhold taxes on gains arising out of HTILs 
transfer of shares of CGP Investments (BMR, 2012). Subsequently, the issue was litigated for 
longtime before the BHC and the SC (Deloitte, 2011). In detail, on December 3, 2008, the 
court [BHC] had permitted tax regulators to do investigation refer to whether the transaction 
is accountable for capital gains tax (see Singhania and Dastaru, 2012). In May 2010, the 
regulators sent an order of holding against Vodafone or VIH in failure of payments to 
withhold taxes. Consequently, Vodafone filed a summons appeal before the BHC; however, 
on September 8, 2010, BHC had dismissed the appeal by mentioning that the dissimilar 
ownership rights acquired by the Vodafone’s VIH had adequate link with the territory of 
India (Deloitte, 2011). Thereafter, Vodafone had filed a petition in the apex court of the 
country ‘SC’; on November 15, 2010, the court had asked VIH to deposit Rs 2.5 billion in 
three weeks, thus the amount is simply to uphold the interest of the revenue department till 
the court makes the final verdict (see Business Standard, 2010; Indian Express, 2010). 
Finally, on January 20, 2012, SC has given a landmark judgment in favor of Vodafone, 
stating that the deal had no connection with territory of the country, and therefore tax 
authorities have no right to impose any capital gains tax (see Economic Times, 2012).52 
[Insert Figure 3 here] and [Insert Box 1 here] 
 
6. Systemic analysis of the case – point and counterpoint 
It is worth stating that case analysis is an important course of case-study investigation 
across the inter-disciplinary electives. We therefore show our systemic and careful analysis of 
the given case (see Figure 4). In addition, we provide relevant previous literature that fits in 
(to) the given context. In Keyal and Advani (2010: 513), the authors mention that 
“it is a universally recognized presumption that laws made by any country are intended to be 
applicable to its own territory and are aimed at governing their domestic conditions”.  
More importantly, a country’s jurisdiction should act with regard to the existing laws, 
for instance, “book of law”, and then it has to follow in which the state of law situated or 
located. In other words, it must pursue various guidelines related to “territory of a country”, 
especially in the international business and trading activities. With this intuitive note, we 
then proceed to demonstrate our points and counterpoints in the given case analysis.  
                                                          
52 To conserve space, we do not present the court proceedings, however they are available upon request. 
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We thus start our discussion from the basic Indian Contract Act, 1872 to the recent 
Competition Act, 2002. First, is there any contract exhibited between Vodafone’s VIH and 
Hutchison Whampoa’s HTIL? Our straightforward answer is ‘yes’, because the contract 
titled ‘share purchase agreement’ had occurred within the nature of, for instance, Section 
2(a), (b), (d), (e), (h) and Section 10 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Second, where was the 
contract registered or occurred? According to Hutchison Whampoa and Vodafone Annual 
Reports (see HWL-AR, 2007, 2008; VGP-AR, 2007, 2008), the contract has registered 
outside the territory of India, namely Cayman Islands. To argue this observation, we then 
look seriously and deeply study the relevant acts like Transfer of Property Act, 1882; Indian 
Stamp Act, 1899; Registration Act, 1908; Sections 390-394 of Companies Act, 1956; Wealth 
Tax Act, 1957; Customs Act, 1962; Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999; Monopolies 
and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 (now, Competition Act, 2002); and other valid 
amendments occurred in 2006; nevertheless, we could not find any pertinent section or sub-
section that explains the geographical or territory of India that the deal had some kind of 
nexus with a given country. In addition, we look into the SEBI (SAS&T) Regulations, 1997, 
although no section or paragraph has established in this act, which is relevant to examine 
this case. However, we presume that a tax treaty or foreign trade agreement with a specific 
country must be having such territorial provisions. Indeed, India-Mauritius tax [haven] 
treaty has not amended through Finance (Amendments) Act, 2006, or the government has 
amended, but they have ignored this important proposal. For instance, when the government 
has ignored for some unproductive benefits, then it has to explain why the specific act or 
regulation could not amend in this time or duration; however, we do not find such reasons in 
the given amendments since it is a constitutional validity. 
With this in mind, we ask our third question. Is the method of ‘transfer of shares’ 
between Vodafone and HTIL a direct or an indirect? Prior to answer this question, we must 
acknowledge Vodafone-Hutchison (CGP Investments (Holdings) Limited) deal information 
(see, for instance, Figure 3). In this hypothetical picture, we show that the ‘share transfer’ 
has occurred between VIH and HTIL. In fact, both subsidiaries have no direct assessment or 
connection with India. As a result, the deal becomes India’s offshore transaction in the view 
of ‘indirect transfer of shares’. In line with discussion, we further look whether Indian 
Income Tax Act, 1961 has any section or provision to levy capital gain tax on such indirect 
transfers when the deal becomes offshore transaction. Here, our straightforward answer is 
‘no’, but such taxes have been exempted in the existing Income Tax Act, 1961. In other 
words, section 47(vi) explains, “where there is a transfer of any capital asset in the scheme of 
amalgamation by an amalgamating company to the amalgamated company, such transfer 
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will not regarded as a transfer for the purpose of capital gains tax provided the company 
amalgamated company to whom such assets have been transferred, is an Indian company” 
(see Ray, 2010).53 More importantly, the act does not have provisions related to withholding 
tax, indirect transfer of securities include shares, debt instruments, etc. 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
In fact, “Vodafone’s counsel had argued that as per section 9(1)(i) of the Act, income 
deemed to accrue or arise in India from the transfer of a capital asset “situated in India” 
should be taxed in India” (Deloitte, 2011). Thus, it is worth noting, “the assumption that the 
geographical location of investment matters for its productivity whereas corporate ownership 
structures do not” (Becker and Fuest, 2010). Furthermore, “the nexus of a non-resident with 
the taxing jurisdiction arises where the source of income originates in the jurisdiction” (Jain, 
2012). While the case was ruling in BHC, we find a relevant study by Keyal and Advani 
(2010: 522–524), the authors suggest that the ‘implicit test of nationality or test of 
protectiveness’ should have been considered and evaluated. Hence, the deal has not been 
attracted the two tests. They also presume, “in some advanced countries, withholding tax in 
case of non-residents applies only when payments are made by residents to non-residents”. 
As a result, SC has finally make his judgment in favor Vodafone that tax authorities have no 
jurisdiction to impose capital gains taxes on offshore deals or indirect transfer of shares.54 In 
particular, the court further observes that controlling interest is a contractual right and could 
not consider as property (BMR, 2011). Further, it has terrifically pointed out that any 
judgment should be given with regard to existing law or book of law. Lastly, we strongly 
support the views and judgment given by the apex court of India. However, this would be a 
good lesson for tax authorities, M&A regulators, local entrepreneurs, foreign investors, and 
society, as well. Four decades ago, Hymer (1970: 447) argues that “MNEs, because of their 
size and international connections, have certain flexibility for escaping regulations imposed 
in one country”. We thus support the views of Hymer in this particular aspect. 
 
7. Theory testing, and theory development and lawful propositions 
                                                          
53 The act is clearly mentioned that tax concession to the amalgamating company and amalgamated 
company. The act also covered provisions for demerger of a company and slump sale (see Chapter 2(1B) 
of the Income Tax Act). Moreover, the act has not been defined what is merger, acquisition or takeover 
but it has presumed ‘amalgamations’ as mergers and acquisitions.   
54 More importantly, the court held that both Vodafone and Hutchison Whampoa’s HTIL were not “fly by 
night” operators or short-term investors; hence, they had contributed substantially Rs. 20,242 crore 
(US$3.76 billion) in the form of both direct and indirect taxes to the exchequer for the period 2003‒2011 
(Hindu, 2012). 
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The outstanding part of this paper aims to test 14 theories that have propounded in 
different business research forums, for instance, Caves and Hymer’s theory of FDI, Uppsala 
theory of firm internationalization Dunning’s eclectic theory, Penrose’s RBV theory, and 
Jensen and Meckling’s agency theory, just to name a few.55 In addition, we look up two 
important theorems that have tested in previous studies like multinational corporate 
ownership and subsidiary-specific advantages, and learning-by-doing. Thereafter, we 
propose our new theory ‘Farmers Fox Theory’, and offer lawful propositions. 
Most strategy, IB and finance researchers explore that a firm reports a significant 
growth while choosing a corporate inorganic model compared to an organic model. For 
instance, growth can be seen in terms of market share, profitability, economies of scale, 
competitive advantage (see Porter, 1985), new market experience, and so forth of synergies. 
Indeed, the model that we indentified in our select case is an ‘acquisition’ and it is a cross-
border acquisition. On the other hand, extensive research on internationalization evidence 
that most U.S. and UK based, and other developed-country multinationals have 
internationalized their operations, corporate ownership, and products and services through 
mergers and acquisitions. Similarly, recent research on emerging economies shows that 
emerging-market firms are being adopting and following both past and current strategic 
alternatives of DMNEs. With this intuitive note, we therefore test the aforementioned 
theories in the current Vodafone-Hutchison deal (see Table 1). 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Regarding theory development and lawful propositions, we establish a triangular 
association between systemic case analysis, relevant CB-M&A literature, and theory testing. 
We thus develop a theory in light of a given country’s weak legal framework and its foreign 
acquisitions for a great deal of advances in the current knowledge refer to M&As, alliances, 
network coordination and buyouts. We therefore define our theory as “Farmers Fox 
Theory”. It reveals that  
“a given country’s weak (loopholes in) financial and tax regulatory system benefits 
both the acquirer and the target firm in cross-border mergers and acquisitions based on two 
assumptions: first, one must have some experience with the given economic and regulatory 
environment or some kind of alliance with a local firm; second, other one should new to the 
economy where the target firm registered or associated with. At the same time, this 
economic behavior adversely affects its fiscal income or revenue”.   
                                                          
55 We thank the Editor-in-Chief, Professor Masaaki Kotabe for his fruitful suggestion that has prompted 
this supplementary section ‘theory testing’.  
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In addition, we acknowledge some important limitations that have to be checked by 
the future scholars before testing this theory. While fulfilling these guidelines, one should 
receive impartial results in a given economic setting based on the assumptions of theory. 
First, a given study must be within the foreign mergers or acquisitions. Second, the given 
sample should have been delayed or broken, or both. Third, there should be a government or 
state involvement (or action) in that delayed or broken deal. Fourth, there should not be a 
conflict of interest between acquirer and target firm. Fifth, both the firms can be different 
each other in business nature. Sixth, either the firms can have prior alliance experience or 
not, which could not influence our theory. Seventh, this theory also supports, and in line 
with ‘liability of foreignness’ (Zaheer, 1995). Eighth, our theory is not feasible to apply for 
domestic transactions; however, we endorse ‘liability of localness’ – when a given economy 
enterprises internationalize their operations or seeking to invest in other foreign nations (see, 
for instance, Perez-Batres and Eden, 2008). Finally, the deal can be any form - that is either 
pre-merger negotiations or during the merger process but should not be post-merger 
integration. 
To test our theory in future research, we suggest lawful propositions for implications 
of IB forum. Indeed, we provide case evidences to legalize our propositions. Thus, these 
propositions would advance the current knowledge of foreign acquisitions or alliances. The 
propositions are as follows. 
  
Proposition 1. A given country’s weak financial markets and tax regulatory system 
benefits both the acquirer and the target firm in cross-border investments or acquisitions. 
Case testimony: Prior to provide case proofs, we define what a weak regulatory system 
is. In a given period, where a country’s regulatory system does not advance in line with 
similar group of countries, or should not adopt or amend specific rules and guidelines for a 
public good, and when the system has corrupted by the given political instability and 
bureaucrats inefficiency, thus together leads to delay or break both public and business-
purpose legal procedures – is called “weak regulatory system”. More importantly, this weak 
system adversely affects government’s fiscal income whist benefiting other stakeholders. 
In our case, Vodafone has benefitted in the form of capital gains tax that the India’s 
apex court has given its landmark judgment by stating that the existing tax guidelines do not 
allow tax authorities to impose capital gains tax on Vodafone in the current Vodafone-
Hutchison deal. As a result, Vodafone has benefited approximately 20 per cent on a given 
deal amount (US$10.9 billion), which is equal to US$2.18 billion. On the other hand, 
Hutchison Whampoa benefited in the form of premium value that has paid by the Vodafone. 
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In reality, HWL has invested approximately US$2.6 billion in India since 1995 and sold to 
Vodafone for US$10.9 billion, which benefited US$8.3 billion, per se. In the paradigm of 
international laws, it is said that only an acquirer is liable to pay tax and not the target firm. 
In sum, both the acquirer and the target firm are benefited because of loopholes in the given 
country’s institutional setting. 
 
Proposition 2. Acquirer or merged firm gains new knowledge, acquisition experience 
and other learning proposals while acquiring a target firm located in (or associated with) 
weak legal and regulatory framework. 
Case testimony: As a result of long-time delay in judging the given case, Vodafone had 
acquired a great deal of knowledge on a given country’s constitutional system, weakness of 
the regulatory setting, approaching public administration authorities and bureaucrats, 
linkage between politicians, bureaucrats, industry associations, jurisdictions, media and 
public, and knowing the given market potential for its survival. Thus, this acquisition is a 
kind of learning experience to DMNEs while entering negotiations or doing business in 
countries like India. If Vodafone could advance their deeper eyesight, therefore it would be 
head of other multinational giants in the world economy telecommunications-market. 
Proposition 3-1. Foreign acquisition transactions get delay - when a given country 
adopts developed-economies legal guidelines without cause-benefit analysis, does not 
understand and define the actual purpose of the acts, does not perform regular amendments, 
or does amend or not amend without any explanation, and lazy public administration, thus 
together form a weak constitutional system, which damages public or social good. 
Proposition 3-2. In cross-country deals, acquiring firms acquisition cost increases 
coherently, for instance, communication cost, legal proceedings cost and other associated 
costs because of a given country’s regulatory authorities exerts, behaviour and dealings. 
Proposition 3-3. The increased acquisition cost (total acquisition cost − actual 
transaction value) would adversely affect acquiring firm’s stock returns and accounting 
earnings. 
Case testimony: To the best of our knowledge, it is one of the worst long-time delayed 
cross-country deals in the world economy, especially in telecommunications sector. Thus, 
the deal had initiated in December 2006, announced in the media in February 2007, 
completed in May 2007, tax authorities filed a petition in the given country’s state 
jurisdiction [...] and finally, Supreme court of India given its judgment in January 2012 (see 
Box 1 for time line of the deal). In sum, number of months that the transaction has 
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consumed in the account of Vodafone approximately 62. Hence, we support some case 
proofs with the theory ‘liability of foreignness’ (Zaheer, 1995). 
Conversely, we substantiate our proposition (3-1 to 3-3) from the recent foreign 
acquisition deals that associated with the given country. First, Bharti Airtel wanted to 
acquire or merge with South African-based MTN Group. Thus, this deal had delayed and 
then cancelled during three-round negotiations (2008-2009) because of regulatory hurdles, 
which have authorized by the SEBI and the Ministry of Finance. For instance, the hurdles 
refer to dual listing norms and complex deal structure (see Reddy, et al., 2012). In fact, the 
reality of the case lies here “the given country’s regulatory system does not define what dual 
listing is”. In this regard, one should raise different blended questions, for instance, when a 
given country owns an Asia’s oldest stock exchange (Bombay Stock Exchange established in 
1875), becomes an independent country in 1947, implemented new economic policy in 1991, 
and most financial regulations have amended in 1994 and 2006; though, why this country’s 
legal framework does not have guidelines for dual listing or any other specific acts. Second, 
this is an interesting deal between UK-based Vedanta Resources and UK-origin Cairn 
Energy. It looks similar to our current case. Thus, it has delayed in light of production 
sharing contracts and open offer issues, and then finally completed (see Nangia et al., 2011). 
Because of delay in providing judgment, Vodafone had expensed lots of costs like 
communication cost, legal proceedings cost and other associated costs. Therefore, we 
strongly believe that these costs would adversely affect Vodafone’s stock returns and 
accounting returns during 2007-2011. To proven the later one, one should test ‘efficient 
market hypothesis’ propounded by Fama et al. (1969). On the other hand, one can use an 
event-study method to observe significant difference between pre-deal and post-deal period 
of a given stock. Hence, it is not advised to test the later theory without having substantial 
sample. 
 
Proposition 4-1. Autocratic holding company structures initiate multi-layered 
ownership forms like subsidiary-firms, networks, and alliances. 
Proposition 4-2. Global multi-layered ownership structures benefit a given holding 
company in terms of acquiring strategic advantages, for instance, internationalization, 
knowledge creation, corporate control, network coordination, and tax advantage. 
Case testimony: The propositions 4-1 and 4-2 are being developed based on relevant 
literature, case information, systemic case analysis and theory testing (see, for instance, 
‘internalization theory and subsidiary-specific advantages’). Also, see Hutchison Whampoa’s 
multinational ownership structure (Figure 2). 
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8. Policy implications and Conclusions 
While summarizing the aforementioned extensive literature, fruitful discussions on 
Vodafone‒Hutchison telecom offshore deal and theory testing/development, we have 
obtained substantial backdrop to suggest some recommendations for policy regime that 
would improve the existing corporate governance standards of a given economy. We then 
formally uncover this section into two societies. First, a great deal of lawful proposals is 
advised for M&A regulatory framework. Second, some key guidelines are recommended for 
MNEs and managers. Finally, we summarize the act of our intent behind this study, and 
conclude the retrospective investigation of the given case. 
Many advanced economies’ researchers, policy makers and consultants suggest that a 
country’s economic growth not only depends on its financial system and financial 
development, but also induces by its constitutional and legal infrastructure. Indeed, both 
notions play an important role in an economic functioning that transforms the economy 
from a controlled-setting to an open-economy environment. As of developed markets policy-
reforms initiated in 80’s and emerging economies deregulation began in 90’s, there is a large 
amount of international trade between country-to-country and continental-to-continental. 
With subsequent reforms, emerging economies government-undertaking industrial 
enterprises and local entrepreneurs have gained a significant amount of knowledge in both 
economics and business administration. For instance, one can observe technology transfer, 
capital formation, exchange of ideas, transfer of wealth, experience of cross-culture, and so 
forth of multidisciplinary proofs. As a result, [today] EMNEs and local companies are 
choosing mergers or acquisitions as one of their long-term corporate strategies. More 
importantly, they are competing with DMNEs and acquiring local companies in developed 
economies setting beside their counter players (see Ramamurti, 2012a). To be sure, this is a 
part of internationalization but it is a kind of “reverse-investment-flow” (see Govindarajan 
and Ramamurti, 2011; Peng, 2012).  
However, when we ‘lookup’ deeply through our ‘lenses’ there is a huge amount of 
disturbances, consequences, litigations, improper policy guidelines, arrogance of regulatory 
system, inefficient bureaucratic administration, unethical political power, a land for 
corruption, allegations, controversies, religion wars, and so forth of economic calamities 
within the system are folded, mixed, unbroken and detachable.56 By and large, Indians are 
induced by their own setup, culture, structure, attitude, and so on. Consequently, most 
                                                          
56  For instance, an act of disagreement or quarrel in both the intra-state jurisdiction and inter-state 
jurisdictions for different reasons ranging from a legitimate need [drinking water] to a robust constitutional 
issue [state partition].     
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DMNEs have greatly been affected (injected) and left their businesses; hence, someone keep 
on doing business because of one principle‒ “one should not damage his (her) character or 
system because of others influence or inefficiency”.57 Therefore, we strongly believe that one 
can find the abovementioned observations straightway in countries like India. The radical 
change and regulatory regime in the era of globalization and liberalization waves, one shall 
pose an open question: where (what) is an investor protection? Does investor protection 
guidelines different for foreign MNEs compared to local companies? Is there any corporate 
governance code in a given country’s financial system?     
8.1. Implications for M&A regulators and Legal framework 
In the limelight of the Worldwide Governance Indicators, World Bank defined the term 
‘governance’ as follows. 
“Governance consists of the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is 
exercised. This includes the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the 
capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of 
citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them”. 
In Licht et al. (2005), the authors mention that legal reform is the primary vehicle in 
the hands of policy makers for peacefully inducing social change. Likewise, sustainable 
development of a given economic nation very much depends on a functioning judiciary, thus 
government could promise to enforce private property rights that would benefit potential 
investors (Ramello and Voigt, 2012). It is worth stating that taxes and penalties are the 
important sources of revenue for a given economy that would help in implementing various 
fiscal policies for economic growth; however, it has to govern by the relevant laws, thus 
there should be reasonable congruence in both the fiscal and the legal structures (Ezeoha and 
Ogamba, 2010: 8). In fact, both national and global welfare maximization requires a cross-
border cash-flow tax regime (Becker and Fuest, 2010: 173). In a corporate governance 
practice, for instance, we support U.S. rulings and others views in favor of shareholders. The 
President’s Advisory Panel of Federal Tax Reform (2005 In Huizinga and Voget, 2009) has 
advocated the elimination of worldwide taxation by the U.S. economy. Similarly, the ‘best-
price’ rule under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires that all stockholders be paid 
the highest consideration paid to any stockholder in connection with a tender offer (Hao and 
Howe, 2011: 1114). However, a prerequisite likely to be that the legal infrastructure is well 
                                                          
57 In other words, overseas investment brings new capital, technology and jobs. In 2002, DMNEs had 
invested roughly US$162 billion in the developing world, up from US$15 billion. In India, for instance, 
FDI has contributed to the creation of a more than US$10 billion-a-year software and outsourcing 
industry, which employs 0.5 million people who perform white-collar jobs for foreign companies (see 
Farrell et al., 2004: 25-29). Also, see the foreign investment and consolidation in the Brazilian telecom 
sector (Maciel et al., 2006). 
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developed, measures have taken to reduce extreme volatility of stock prices (Hermes and 
Lensink, 2000: 509).58 We also straightway support the following important argument. It is 
necessary to have extra-territorial application of domestic competition law to regulate the 
anti-competitive activities of foreign firms taking place in the given country (see Jain, 2012). 
Similarly, the McKinsey suggests some proposals for legal and regulatory regime, and then 
we eventually endorse and acknowledge their guidelines. 
“Economic and legal framework should make easy fair competition while extenuating the impact 
of market failures. Further, a fact-based approach and a transparent system are essential for most favorable 
regulatory decisions. In fact, poor legal environment is the key determinant limiting both productivity and 
growth across the world economy, particularly developing or emerging countries. Thus, a provision or an 
act must echo the legal and institutional development; by contrast, adopting international regulations is 
rarely suitable and can be downright harmful” (Beardsley and Farrell, 2005: 50, 58).59  
For instance, regulations are a crucial factor for an industry, and therefore managers 
require spending heaps of time managing them carefully.60 The peculiar thing is that “over 
the past decade, the given economy has received a great deal of foreign capital from various 
kinds of investors. In other words, the capitalist firms have typically used Singapore or 
Mauritius established firms to invest in India because of their highly sympathetic tax 
schemes or treaties” (KPMG, 2012). The most important irregular and controversial issue is 
that “Ministry of Finance [Union of India] retrospectively illuminated that it has the right to 
tax the income arising from the country irrespective of where the business is incorporated” 
(see Financial Express, 2012; Kanekal and Ganz, 2012). By contrast, most recently a 
government panel has indicated that foreign MNEs undertaking mergers or acquisitions in 
India be obliged to pay tax only prospectively, not retrospectively [looking back] (see Times 
of India, 2012). 
We disagree factually to disclose the essential facts or the loopholes in the given 
M&A regulatory system. When we read M&A related acts (for example, Companies Act, 
1956; Income Tax Act, 1961; SEBI (SAS&T) Regulations, 1997; and Competition Act, 
2002) the term ‘merger’ or ‘acquisition’ has not been defined or illustrated. More immorally, 
the acts have used both the terms in various sections without appropriate explanation or 
interpretation. In the land of laws, if any law, regulation or act uses any term without 
defining it properly or meaningfully, such acts are treated as unlawful acts. Thus, we 
                                                          
58  See, for example, European Commission’s enactment Merger Control Regulations, 1989, and 
amendments in different years (Davison, 2003; Davison and Johnson, 2000). Also, see Ormosi 
(forthcoming). 
59 In a study of 145 countries, the World Bank has found that the administrative cost of complying with 
regulations is three times higher for businesses in poor countries than for those in rich ones (as cited In 
Beardsley and Farrell, 2005: 50). 
60 See Jain et al. (2005). 
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strongly argue that why do these acts become perpetual in nature for a social good. In other 
words, why parents name their baby after one month or two month of born? If we say, it is a 
kind of fashion or culture, and then it is absolutely a wrong approach, because naming born 
baby is an important “principle of identification” under social jurisdiction. Moreover, many 
of the terms used in various acts has not explained or interpreted carefully. For instance, Jain 
(2012: 117) mentions, “there should be a clear definition of the term “dominant position” 
under the Competition Act, 2002.  
Therefore, government and policy makers should take immediate call to rewrite and 
explain the terms that had left in various acts.61 To do so, there must be a high-level investor 
protection committee, which should comprise a group of knowledge and experience persona. 
For example, the persona or individuals include emeritus professionals from the RBI, SEBI, 
CCI, Department of Revenue, and Registrar of Companies, as well. More importantly, the 
committee must accommodate retired policy makers in developed economies (e.g. U.S., UK, 
Canada, Germany), emeritus academic researchers from the field of economics, finance and 
law, retired chief judges from the apex court and the state-level jurisdictions, and 
experienced practitioners like Chartered Accountants, Company Secretaries and Cost 
Accountants.62 Indeed, we are not confident that India will dramatically change within a 
given period without having such aforementioned committees or groups. 
8.2. Guidelines and Recommendations for Multinational Managers 
According World Bank’s governance indicators of 2009, India’s political stability 
(1.51) constitutes the major obstacle due to its bloated government, ethnic conflicts, and 
hostile neighbors (Luo et al., 2011: 194). We thus strongly acknowledge two motivational 
idioms before recommending our guidelines. First, the proverb is recorded in John 
Heywood’s […] “look before you leap”, which explains ‘check that you are clear what is 
ahead of you before making a decision that you cannot go back on’.63 Second, in the medical 
jargon, it is said that ‘prevention is better than cure’. In the British Medical Journal (BMJ), 
Loefler (2004: 115) states that “prevention […] is a quote from the goddess Hygiene, yet the 
vintage is recent and the wisdom is more limited than it appears”. In Barbopoulos et al. 
(2012) and Erel et al. (2012), the authors suggest that “knowledge of the legal system and 
regulatory provisions, and tax subsidies on international investments or new business 
ventures is seriously essential for the managers of acquiring enterprises”. In other words, 
both MNEs and managers must read and understand the legal terminology and allied laws 
                                                          
61 See the promotional roles of state government and Japanese direct investments in U.S. (Kotabe, 1993). 
62 For instance, the emeritus academic researcher means “one who publishes extensive research articles in 
highest impact factor journals within their field and experience of consultancy or project handling”.   
63 Source http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/look-before-you-leap.html.  
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associated with specific industries prior to establishing their alliances or acquisitions in a 
given world economy especially countries like India. More importantly, one should have his 
(her) own strategy to handle particular situation down the line ranging from a watchman to 
higher-level authorities, because most foreign managers experience lots of difficulties like 
language, culture, and system in developing countries, for instance, Asian region. In fact, we 
argue that bribe and corruption would adversely affect managers’ decisions in different 
settings. We also contend that lobbying and politicking are being the most influential 
determinants of DMNEs new venture decisions and long-term corporate strategies. In 
Schöllhammer and Nigh (1986), the authors suggest, “one should not only examine the 
conflictive political issues within the foreign or host economies, but also supportive political 
improvement and changes in intergovernmental dealings”. We therefore suggest that having 
a coordination, network or alliance with project consultants would help in understanding the 
current business scenario in a given country. Nevertheless, they should choose the best 
choice of business strategies to tackle the government, and to compete with local companies. 
In particular, we recommend that one should be transparent in his (her) system instead of 
contending the government for ‘transparent system’. We thus conclude our study. 
8.3. Concluding remarks      
In this paper, we analyze and discuss the India’s long-time delayed cross-border 
acquisition ‘Vodafone-Hutchison deal’ in the view of international taxation and litigation 
issues with Union of Indian since 2007. (Of course, we select this case with our utmost 
interest and attention.) To do so, we perform case-investigation study to draw fruitful 
implications for economy and managers, and insights that are concealed in specific for social 
good. We therefore present our conclusions from the aforementioned compendium of 
extensive CB-M&As literature related to legal framework in general and taxation in specific, 
India’s M&A regulatory framework, systemic case analysis, and theory testing and 
development. A novel finding of our study indicates that a given country’s weak regulatory 
system benefits both the acquirer and the target firm; at the same time, this economic 
behavior adversely affects its fiscal income or budget. Further, our key observations are as 
follows. First, the Vodafone-Hutchison transaction should not countable as Indian offshore 
transaction, because the deal has no connection with territory of India under the theory of 
economic geography. More importantly, tax authorities have utterly failed to collect at least 
a penny of capital gains tax from the buyer ‘Vodafone’. Thus, it is a ‘share purchase 
agreement’ between buyer and seller that has occurred outside the country. In other words, it 
is an indirect transfer of shares. Second, we argue that capital gains tax could not be imposed 
on such offshore deals because of one strong reason. Thus, it is the loopholes neither in the 
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present taxation system nor in the outstanding intelligence of Vodafone, but it is an act of 
intention, misrepresentation, or inefficiency of tax authorities. If so, it has to be one – when 
the government has amended many policies and regulations in 2006, what was the intention 
behind India-Mauritius (or Cayman Islands) tax treaty or free trade agreement (FTA), which 
had not amended in the view of withholding tax and indirect transfer of shares/securities? 
Nevertheless, we are sure that some act of fraud or misrepresentation could happen at the 
backend of regulatory bodies (or, bureaucrats) who were controlling the Department of 
Revenue under the Ministry of Finance during that period. If one can investigate seriously, it 
is easier to find a great amount of loopholes in the Indian constitutional framework and legal 
system. Consequently, these loopholes shall be filled in the forthcoming amendments.  
Third, we support apex court’s final judgment in favor of Vodafone that the deal has 
no nexus with territory of India. Because, a respectful court’s bench or chief justice give his 
or her judgment based on book of law or existing laws. Thus, a judgment should not deliver 
based on future predictions or retrospective amendments. For instance, if judgment is given 
based on retrospective in nature, we strongly argue “jails must be empty without criminals”, 
because every criminal was good in conduct before a crime. In this case, we oppose that 
retrospective change in tax laws would adversely affect DMNEs business operations, foreign 
investor community, continuity in business, and their bulky investments in India. As a 
result, country’s economic freedom and corporate governance standards could sharply 
collapse. (If DMNEs sell their equity stake or asset sale to local companies in India, thus, 
they could move to litigation and complex free system in other parts of the world especially 
Africa and Middle East regions.) Moreover, how can you force a retrospective policy in 2012 
Budget guidelines that would be implemented roughly from 1962-63? Therefore, the Indian 
government should realize their undesirable attack on foreign investor or MNEs in various 
understandings like investor protection, corporate ownership structure and double taxation. 
However, government should think deeply before going to implement GAAR or any other 
action that would influence both public and corporate governance for a social good. In 
addition, government should encourage young researchers who can really bring the research 
outcome for policy recommendations and regulatory framework that likely to be IB, finance 
and law specializations.  
Yet, our study has few limitations (like, Choi and Brommels, 2009). We have 
carefully recorded the events of the case and arranged them in chronological order, and then 
it has systematically analyzed in retrospective manner. However, we admit the jeopardy that 
the investigation and discussions of the case might be inclined by untrue memories or 
falsification of data extracted from print media and electronic sources.  
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We therefore suggest some areas that thirst future investigation. 64  For instance, 
determinants of foreign acquisitions in emerging economies, interview-based case study 
research in pre-merger decision making process and post-merger integration, cross-
comparative analysis of domestic and foreign acquisitions, and impact of policy reforms on 
corporate restructuring strategies. More purposely, our new theory‒Farmers Fox Theory‒ 
and propositions would help scholars in doing similar investigations and related empirical 
studies on Institutional Voids in Emerging Economies. In addition, scholars are encouraged to 
do further research in developing new theories, models, propositions and hypotheses for 
improvement in existing knowledge related to border-crossing alliances, joint ventures and 
M&As. Last but not least, what are the dramatic macroeconomic changes that have 
occurred in both developed and emerging economies around the recent global financial 
crises? If so, do they influence corporate earnings, then which industry is adversely affected? 
                                                          
64 Also, see Aharoni and Brock (2010), Bell et al. (2012), Buckley and Casson (2009), Dess et al. (1995), 
Luo et al. (2011), Peng (2004), and Seno-Alday (2010).  
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Figure 1. India’s cross-border mergers and acquisitions during 2000-2011 
Source: Authors plot a graph based on data extracted from the UNCTAD Statistics refer to worldwide 
foreign direct investments, and cross-border mergers and acquisitions. 
It was appeared in my paper, Reddy et al. (2014a) – Farmers Fox Theory. 
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Figure 2. Ownership structure of Hutchison Whampoa Limited (HWL) 
I prepared and kept online for readers, but not published this figure.   
52 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Structure of Vodafone-Hutchison deal 
Notes: (1) Hutchison Whampoa’s HTIL has invested indirectly in Hutchison-Essar* while having 100% 
equity holding in CGP Investments, (2) Vodafone’s Vodafone International Holdings has acquired HTIL’s 
100% equity holdings in CGP Investments, and (3) as a result of direct acquisition occurred in Cayman 
Islands, Vodafone become a joint venture partner in India’s Hutchison-Essar. *After the deal, Hutchison 
Essar has been changed to ‘Vodafone Essar’, and thereafter, on October 11, 2011, it again referred to 
“Vodafone India Limited” (see VGP-AR, 2012). 
It was appeared in my paper, Reddy et al. (2014a) – Farmers Fox Theory. 
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Figure 4. Systemic analysis of Vodafone-Hutchison deal 
Notes: VG – Vodafone Group Plc, UK; VIH – Vodafone International Holdings, The Netherlands; HW – 
Hutchison Whampoa Limited, Hong Kong; HTIL – Hutchison Telecommunications International 
Limited, Hong Kong; and CGP – CGP Investments (Holdings) Limited, Cayman Islands. 
It was appeared in my paper, Reddy et al. (2014a) – Farmers Fox Theory. 
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Box 1. Time-line of the deal 
 Date Description 
◉ 2006 December 23 Vodafone started negotiations for Hutchison stake in Hutch-Essar Limited (HEL) (a listed entity in 
India). Of course, Reliance Communications was in the bidding race during the same week. 
➾ 2007 January 9 Vodafone initiated the due diligence work of Hutchison Whampoa and Hutch-Essar Limited to 
asses and propose its decision. However, by Feb 10, 2007, the bidding for Hutch was in process, and 
received proposals from various bidders, for example, Hinduja’s with Qatar Telecom. 
☂ 2007 February 11 Vodafone International Holdings (VIH), a Netherland-based subsidiary of Vodafone has acquired 
100% equity stake of Hutchison Telecom International Limited (a wholly owned subsidiary of 
Hutchison Whampoa Limited) in CGP Investments (Holdings) Ltd, Caymon Islands. As a result, 
Vodafone has become the joint partner in Indian-based HEL, for US$11.2 billion (this value was 
printed in different print-media–news papers). Therefore, the new joint venture would be Vodafone-
Essar Limited (now, Vodafone India Limited). 
➾ 2007 March 15 Vodafone and Essar reached agreement on jointly managing the (previous) HEL. 
◊ 2007 May 5 Vodafone-Hutch deal gets approval from India's Finance Minister. In particular, between March 16, 
2007 and Many 5, 2007, the deal was scrutinized by FIPB, and other regulated bodies.  
☛ 2008 December 3 Bombay High Court ((BHC), a state-level jurisdiction of Maharastra located in Mumbai) permitted 
the tax authorities to investigate whether the deal is liable for capital gains tax in India. 
☞ 2010 May The tax authorities issued an order of holding that they had the necessary jurisdiction to proceed 
against Vodafone. Then, Vodafone filed a writ petition before the BHC objecting the tax authorities’ 
action, and stating that the transaction had no nexus with the territory of India. 
☟ 2010 September 8 BHC has dismissed the petition by stating that the diverse rights and entitlements acquired by 
Vodafone had sufficient connection with the territory of India. 
☝ 2010 September–
October 
Contending the BHC's judgment, Vodafone filed a writ petition in the apex court "Supreme Court 
of India" (SC). 
✒ 2010 November 
15 
SC asked VIH to deposit Rs 2.5 billion; thus, the amount is merely to safeguard the interest of the 
tax department until the court makes the final judgment. 
↧ 2010 – 2011 During this period, several rounds and discussions have been taken place between Vodafone and 
Union of India in the apex court. 
✌ 2012 January 12 Finally, SC makes its judgment in favor of Vodafone. Thus, SC has disagreed with the conclusions 
arrived at the BHC, and stating that “tax authorities has no territorial tax jurisdiction to tax the 
offshore transaction, and then directed the tax authorities to return the Rs 2.5 billion deposited by 
the Vodafone with 4 per cent interest within two months, and the bank guarantee of Rs 8.5 billion 
submitted at the SC registry within four weeks. 
Source: Authors organized’ based on information collected from BMR (2012), Deloitte (2011), Economic Times (2012), Hindu 
(2012), KPMG (2012), Singhania and Dastaru (2012), and VGP-AR (2007, 2008). 
Notes: We have no case description for the year 2009. Also, see Appendix C for court proceedings.  
It was appeared in my paper, Reddy et al. (2014a) – Farmers Fox Theory.  
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Table 1. Theory testing and case illustrations 
Theory and its description Theory testing 
Illustrations from the given CB-M&A case ‘Vodafone-
Hutchison deal’ 
Theories in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 
Theory of Foreign Direct Investment (Caves, 1971, 1974; Hymer, 1970, 
1976; IMF; UNCTAD). 
 
In Hymer’s view, key motive behind FDI is to gain control over 
marketing facilities in order to facilitate the spread of their products 
(Hymer, 1970: 445); for instance, have to do with the prudent use of 
assets, and (ii) control of the MNE is desired in order to remove 
competition between that overseas firm and firms in other markets 
(Hymer, 1976: 23–25). More specifically, Caves (1971) indicates that 
there are two important economic features of FDI: (i) it ordinarily 
effects a net transfer of real capital from one country to another; and 
(ii) it represents entry into a national industry by a firm established in 
overseas market. According to IMF, “FDI enterprise is an enterprise 
(institutional unit) in the financial or non-financial corporate sectors of 
the economy in which a non-resident investor owns 10% or more of 
the voting power of an incorporated enterprise or has the equivalent 
ownership in an enterprise operating under another legal structure”.  
As mentioned in previous sections, Vodafone Group Plc 
is Britain's diversified telecom MNE that has an offshore 
subsidiary ‘VIH’ located in the Netherlands. On the 
other hand, HWL is Hong Kong’s largest conglomerated 
MNE, which has an on-shore Asian subsidiary firm 
‘HTIL’ headquartered in Hong Kong; thus, HTIL has 
100% equity stake in CGP Investments (Holdings) 
Limited located in Cayman Islands. Of course, both 
MNEs have significant equity interest in their respective 
subsidiaries. The key point is that CGP owns a 51.95% 
indirect shareholding in HEL (an Indian-listed entity). 
According to FDI theory, Vodafone buys a HTIL’s 
holdings in CGP Investments through its subsidiary firm 
VIH for US$10.9 billion. We therefore suggest that this 
equity acquisition has satisfied the views of Hymer and 
Caves and the IMF. 
Market Imperfections Theory (Hymer, 1970, 1976; Brewer, 1993). 
 
The firm’s decision to invest overseas is explained as a strategy to 
capitalize on certain capabilities not shared by competitors in foreign 
countries (Hymer, 1970).[a] However, FDI tends to reduce the number 
of alternatives facing sellers and to stay the forces of international 
competition (Hymer, 1970: 443). In particular, If the market is 
imperfect, the owner may not be able to appropriate fully the returns 
[…] some firms have leverage in specific doing, which may find it 
profitable to utilize this leverage by instituting overseas business 
(Hymer, 1976: 26–29). Conversely, market imperfections are 
impediments to the "simple interaction of supply and demand to set a 
market price” (as cited In Brewer, 1993: 103–104). Further, it can be 
increased and/or decreased by government policies, because these are 
relevant, and have variability. 
Indian telecommunications sector is one of the imperfect 
markets in Asia. In this case, Vodafone has indirectly 
invested in a given economy through the direct 
acquisition of HTIL stake in CGP Investments. More 
notably, when Hutchison entered in India was a single 
entity that is globally diversified and telecom MNE, 
which had experienced in providing multi-utilized and 
differentiated services in European market. In fact, both 
Vodafone and Hutchison have better understanding 
terms and cooperative agreements in most European 
markets. As of acquisition, Vodafone gains a great deal 
of mobile subscription base, market share and revenue 
during the post-acquisition (see Appendix B). To our 
knowledge, this deal has augmented the Vodafone’s 
market strength and international business network.         
Eclectic Paradigm, OLI framework, or International Production Theory 
(Dunning, 1977, 1980, 1988, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2001). 
 
Dunning suggests that a firm must possess Ownership advantages, 
Location synergies, and Internalization (OLI) within its activities or 
structures while making it internationalization. For instance, the 
condition for international production is that it must be in the best 
interest of firms that possess ownership-specific advantages to transfer 
them across national boundaries within their own organizations rather 
than sell them (Dunning, 1988: 3). He also states that increase in 
overseas production, the tendency to internalize the overseas makers 
for these, and the attractions of a location for overseas production. 
Hence, it will vary based on the motives underlying such production 
activities (Dunning, 1988: 5). This paradigm also explains the extent 
(market seeking), form (resource seeking), and pattern (efficiency 
seeking) of overseas production.[b] 
Ownership advantages: Vodafone Group Plc is a parent 
corporation, through its subsidiary VIH, has acquired 
Hutchison Whampoa’s subsidiary HTIL 100% equity 
stake in CGP Investments. As a result, Vodafone has 
become the major partner by 51.95% equity holdings in 
the Indian-based joint venture Hutchison-Essar (HEL). 
Further, it has acquired an additional 22% equity stake in 
Vodafone India Limited (VIL) from its joint venture 
partner Essar Group (also, see Vodafone profile that 
depicted in the previous sections).  
 
Location advantages: see Appendix B for India’s telecom 
market potential and its growth during 2002-2012. From 
the post-acquisition decision, we strongly believe that 
Vodafone can experience the market scope with their 
service differentiation. Thus, it is an accomplishment of 
market seeking motive thus meets the criteria of 
Dunning’s eclectic paradigm.  
 
Internalization advantages: See, case proofs that 
presented in ‘internalization theory’. 
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Theories in INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
Uppsala Theory of Firm Internationalization (Johanson and 
Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975; Johanson and Vahlne, 1977, 1990, 2003, 
2006, 2009). 
 
Theory of firm internationalization is an account of the interaction 
between attitudes and actual behaviour. Johanson and Wiedersheim-
Paul (1975: 306) presume that the firm first develops in the local 
markets and that the internationalization is the consequence of a series 
of incremental decisions. Hence, obstacles such as knowledge and 
resources can be declined through incremental decision-making and 
learning about the overseas markets. In particular, firms setup 
agencies, for instance, a sales subsidiary and production facilities that 
play a vital role in internationalization process (Johanson and 
Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975: 309). Further, it also assumes that the state 
of internationalization affects perceived opportunities and risks, which 
in turn influence commitment decisions and current activities 
(Johanson and Vahlne, 1990: 12). While the revised model depicts 
dynamic, cumulative processes of learning, as well as trust and 
commitment building (Johanson and Vahlne, 2009: 1424).   
This theory is somewhat suitable to explain the current 
case. However, Vodafone is not new in 
internationalizing their operations, for instance, the 
company’s global presence in terms of number of 
markets has increased dramatically at three-fold from 12 
in 1998 to 38 in 2007, and thereafter, augmented to 40 in 
2011 (as mentioned in ‘company profile’ in this paper). 
Thus, we understand that Vodafone is a globally 
diversified telecommunications MNE that offers different 
premium services in different markets. According to 
theory, the company has entered across the developed 
and developing economies through incremental decision-
making. Of course, this decision made the company as 
world’s second largest telecom operators based on 
subscribers scale. As of the deal that would help the 
company for further diversification in other South Asian 
and East Asian countries.      
Internalization Theory (Buckley and Casson, 1976; Buckley, 1982, 
1988; Buckley and Casson, 1998, 2009). 
 
It is a firm level theory. In Hymer’s (1970: 445) view, MNEs must 
adapt to local environment in each country. In addition, they must 
coordinate their activities in various parts of the world and stimulate 
the flow of ideas across their ownership network. Indeed, internal 
flows were coordinated by information flows through the ‘‘internal 
markets’’ of the firm (Buckley and Casson, 2009). It analyzes the 
choices made by the owners, managers, or trustees of enterprises 
(Buckley and Casson, 2009). Further, optimum size of firm is set where 
the costs and benefits of further internalization are equalized at the 
margin (Buckley and Casson, 2009: 1564). The authors identify two 
types of internalization: operational and knowledge internalization. 
We strongly believe that size and ownership structure of 
a corporate headquarter in multinationals play a key role 
in internalization process that to be effective or worse 
(see, for instance, Collis et al., 2012). In other words, 
there is a great deal of coordination, cooperation and 
control between Vodafone group and its subsidiary firm 
VIH. Similarly, there must be good understandings on 
ownership transfer between Hutchison Whampoa and its 
all subsidiaries especially HTIL, and CGP Investments 
Holdings. In sum, such business relations across the 
national-borders would help while entering in third-party 
country locations like India. More specifically, we 
suggest that internalization has played an important role 
both in completion of deal and in winning the tax 
controversies against Indian courts. In fact, transaction 
cost was reduced because of no capital gains tax.      
Liability of Foreignness (Coase, 1937; Hymer, 1970, 1976; Caves, 1971; 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Zaheer, 1995; Zaheer and Mosakowski, 
1997; Luo et al., 2002; Sethi and Guisinger, 2002; Petersen and 
Pedersen, 2002; Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2007; Boehe, 2011; Bell et al., 
2012; Denk et al., 2012). 
  
Originally, in his doctoral thesis [1960] at MIT, Hymer (1976) 
introduced this concept. In his view, LOF is composed of three factors: 
exchange risk of operating businesses in foreign countries, local 
authorities’ discrimination against foreign companies, and 
unfamiliarity with local business conditions (as cited In Petersen and 
Pedersen, 2002: 342). He termed the same as ‘costs of doing business 
abroad’. In fact, it has been pointed out in Coase’s work that foreign 
firms experience greater transaction costs compared to local firms 
because of foreignness (Coase, 1937). More importantly, Caves (1971) 
discusses about foreign exchange, multinational ownership and 
taxation issues. DiMaggio and Powell (1983: 150) identify three 
mechanisms through which institutional isomorphic change occurs: (1) 
coercive isomorphism that stems from political influence and the 
problem of legitimacy; (2) mimetic isomorphism resulting from 
standard responses to uncertainty; and (3) normative isomorphism, 
associated with professionalization. In the modern era, Zaheer (1995: 
343) argues that LOF could arise at least from four routes: [i] costs 
This theory somewhat supports our case study 
observations. Unfortunately, most LOF studies examine 
or investigate the MNEs and its subsidiaries performance 
during the post-entrance or post-setup of units in a given 
economy and compare those results with local firms. 
Unlike these studies, our case shows the legitimate 
evidence at the foreign market entry-level especially in 
developing economies. Thus, India’s frustrated and rigid 
regulatory behavior, and tax framework are the root 
causes behind world’s long-time delayed cross-country 
acquisition. To support this line, we present the time line 
of the deal (see Box 1). In particular, Vodafone has faced 
various government allegations at two jurisdictions, 
namely BHC (a state-level jurisdiction) and SC (apex 
court of a given country). During these five years (2007-
2011, Vodafone might have spent at least two per cent of 
the deal amount, which is an additional transaction cost 
to the company. In fact, one cannot focus on the 
company operations and the top-level management must 
answer various queries raised by the directors in board 
meetings. Indeed, this issue again raises the controversies 
inside the board; however, they have managed well in a 
given situation. In a nutshell, we agree with the 
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directly associated with spatial distance, [ii] specific costs based on a 
particular company’s unfamiliarity (or, newness), [iii] costs resulting 
from the host country environment (e.g. legitimacy, nationalism), and 
[iv] cost from the home country environment (e.g. restrictions on high-
technology sales). Furthermore, Cuervo-Cazurra et al. (2007) classify 
the difficulties in internationalization: loss of an advantage of resources 
transferred abroad, creation of a disadvantage by resources transferred 
abroad, or lack of complementary resources required to operate.  
propositions of LOF that suggested by Hymer, Coase, 
Caves, Zaheer, Cuervo-Cazurra et al. and others.         
Related theorem:  
Subsidiary-Specific Advantages (Vernon, 1966; Hymer, 1970; Jarillo and 
Martinez, 1990; Birkinshaw, 1996, 1997; Birkinshaw et al., 1998; 
Rugman and Verbeke, 2001; Williams, 2009). 
 
In Hymer’s view, there are two kinds of division of labour: the division 
of labour between firms coordinated by the markets; and the division 
of labour within firms, coordinated by entrepreneurs (Hymer, 1970: 
441). Further, a subsidiary has the potential to drive the local 
awareness, global integration and universal learning capabilities 
(Birkinshaw, 1997). Of course, subsidiary-specific advantages can only 
be sustained in the long run when supported by the parent company 
(Rugman and Verbeke, 2001: 244). Thus, Williams (2009) 
hypothesizes that “greater the level of networking between units of the 
MNE, the more likely it is that the MNE will pursue global initiatives, 
and the greater the sharing of strategic goals by subsidiary managers, 
the more likely it will be that the MNE will pursue global initiatives”.  
It is fact that most MNEs perform business operations 
through their efficient subsidiaries. In this case, 
Vodafone’s subsidiary ‘VIH in the Netherlands’ and 
Hutchison’s subsidiary ‘HTIL’ – are well established in 
the respective locations. Moreover, they have prior 
coordination and experience in European 
telecommunications market. We strongly agree with 
Hymer (1970) […], and Rugman and Verbeke (2001) 
propositions, and suggest the established subsidiaries 
help parent corporations while seeking or entering in a 
third location (for instance, in this case India is the third 
location for both Vodafone and Hutchison). Simply, they 
saved lots of taxes and other deal registration charges 
through their subsidiaries.        
Theories in ORGANIZATION STUDIES 
Institutional Theory (Selznick, 1948; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 
1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 1987; Ashforth and Gibbs, 
1990; Suchman, 1995; Tolbert and Zucker, 1996; Davis et al., 2000; 
Dacin et al., 2002; Trevino et al., 2008). 
  
The action system is imbedded in an institutional matrix, in two forms: 
formal structure of delegation and control, and formal system and the 
social structure (Selznick, 1948: 25). In Meyer and Rowan (1977: 341–
351), the authors suggest that firms that reflect institutional rules tend 
to buffer their formal structures from the uncertainties of technical 
activities […]. Further, institutional rules may affect organizational 
structures and their implementation […]; thus, relationships that 
compose and surround a given organization. Briefly, institutional 
isomorphism promotes the success and survival of organizations. […] 
increases the internal organizational efficiency (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983: 153). In others view, for instance, Ashforth and Gibbs (1990: 
177) mention that organizations are said to be legitimate to the extent 
that its means and ends appear to conform to social norms, values, and 
expectations. In fact, the structure and behaviour of organizations 
become institutionalized through isomorphic pressures (Davis et al., 
2000: 242). Trevino et al. (2008) argues that institutionalization is a 
process that works through all three pillars—cognitive, normative, and 
regulative—and that this process can legitimize a host market for 
foreign investors.  
This theory fairly supports our case study observations. 
While testing this theory, most previous studies do not 
reveal the conclusions or findings at foreign market entry 
level especially cross-border mergers/acquisitions. In 
fact, previous scholars investigate the given sample from 
the ‘firm’s view-point’ and not the ‘nation’s perspective’. 
On the one hand, we agree that Indian institutional 
framework is rigid, complexity, controversy and 
frustrated bureaucratic capital and unethical political 
behavior, no meaning of accountability or responsibility. 
However, this theory does not explain whether these 
institutional behaviors affect the given economy’s fiscal 
revenue or budget. Thus, our theory explains this 
important dichotomy that how a weak regulatory system 
benefits both the acquirer and target firm in the given 
economy international transactions, for instance, FDIs 
and CB-M&As. More importantly, our theory can be 
tested at two-levels, first at firm-level for shareholders 
goodness (investor protection), and second at country-
level for public good.    
Theory of Transaction Cost Economics (Coase, 1937; Hymer, 1976; 
Williamson, 1975, 1979, 1981; Hennart, 1982, 1994; Anderson and 
Gatignon, 1986; Rugman and Verbeke, 1992). 
 
Coase (1937: 387–390) assumes that “the direction of resources is 
dependent directly on the price mechanism; thus, a firm would be 
profitable when there is a cost of using the price mechanism. It is 
important that “entrepreneur has to carry out his function at less cost 
[…] because it is always possible to revert to the open market if he fails 
Regarding this theory, we use the present case 
‘Vodafone-Hutchison deal’ as a transaction cost. In 
particular, the cost of deal depends on what method that 
they (buyer and seller) use in doing valuation of 
Hutchison (HTIL and its share in Indian joint venture 
business), and market potential. (It falls into the 
corporate finance – valuation theory or accounting 
going-concern concept.) However, we argue that the 
transaction cost of the deal is significantly increased due 
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to do this (p. 392). This theory relies on two behavioral assumptions: 
(i) the recognition that human agents are subject to bounded 
rationality, and (ii) at least some agents are given to opportunism 
(Williamson, 1981: 552–553). Conversely, Hennart (1994: 203–204) 
discusses mainly this concept from the view of transaction cost 
approach. Thus, co-operation between different sellers is required 
based on price system for maximization of profit or cash flow. He also 
suggests that “rents are earned whenever the benefits of co-operation 
are greater than the costs of organizing it”. 
to delay in court proceedings and judgment. For 
example, cost of legal proceedings, legal documentation, 
court charges and fees, cost of media, and other related 
costs. Moreover, it is difficult to predict or estimate the 
trade-off between the deal value, market potential and 
uncommon regulatory shocks (costs). It is fact that one 
cannot imagine the affect of government unusual 
behaviors or actions. In a time-bound, one has to face 
these challenges while entering in countries like India.   
Organizational Learning Theory (Cangelosi and Dill, 1965; Hymer, 
1970; Caves, 1971; Fiol and Lyles, 1985; March, 1991; Kogut and 
Zander, 1993; Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998; Bresman et al., 1999; 
Crossan et al., 1999). 
 
In Cangelosi and Dill’s (1965: 203) view, “organizational learning is 
sporadic and stepwise rather than continuous and gradual, and that 
learning of preferences and goals goes hand in hand with learning how 
to achieve them”. Indeed, the essentials of theory include preferences, 
external shocks, routines, imperfect control of outcomes, and process 
for change. In Penrose’s (1959) view, two kinds of knowledge are 
depicted: objective knowledge, and experiential knowledge. However, 
learning is not explicit. In particular, FDI is an instrument, which 
allows business firms to transfer capital, technology, and 
organizational skill from one country to another (Hymer, 1970: 443). 
On the other hand, Fiol and Lyles (1985: 811) define that “the 
development of insights, knowledge, and associations between past 
actions, the effectiveness of those actions, and future actions”. In fact, 
there are two levels of learning: higher-level and lower-level. Hence, 
the ultimate goal of the learning is to improve the existing performance 
for sustaining in future. In others view, “firms compete on the basis of 
the superiority of their information and know-how, and their abilities 
to develop new knowledge by experiential learning” (Kogut and 
Zander, 1993: 640). In other words, a firm that operates in diverse 
national settings and product settings could develop a rich knowledge 
structure and strong technological capabilities (Barkema and 
Vermeulen, 1998: 7).  
From the organizational learning perspective, this case is 
the best example to explain what Vodafone and 
Hutchison have experienced so far in the given economic 
setting. We found factors like stress, control of internal 
factors, experience of external shocks, patience and other 
associated knowledge factors. Indeed, we believe that 
Vodafone can strengthen their future internationalization 
plans through the experiences at (with) India 
(government officials). On the one hand, they might 
have improved the knowledge, for instance, liability of 
foreignness, liability of localness, liability of newness, 
informal relationships that exist in the current Indian 
public administration and judicial system; telecom 
market potential; and so forth of economic, legal and 
administrative behaviors. Of course, it is too difficult to 
estimate or measure the knowledge or experience. We 
therefore suggest that both institutional and regulatory, 
and economic system that exhibited in India would 
adversely affect MNEs (if establish for short-term) and 
benefit MNEs (if establish for long-run).   
Related theorem: 
Learning-by-Doing (Kolb, 1984; March, 1991; Vermeulen and 
Barkema, 2001; Nadolska and Barkema, 2007; Collins et al., 2009). 
 
A well-known strategy researcher Penrose (1959) suggests that “the 
knowledge and experience are the most important sources of 
organization learning”. In line with this, Collins et al. (2009: 1329) 
hypothesize that “organization learning associated with a firm's prior 
acquisition experience increases the likelihood the firm will engage in 
subsequent international acquisitions”. Thus, Collins et al. find that 
prior acquisition experience within a host country affects subsequent 
CB-M&As in that market. Thus, the moral of this theorem is that 
organizations learn from their previous corporate strategic actions. 
As mentioned in the Vodafone profile, in 2000 it has 
acquired Germany’s Mannesmann for US$231 billion, 
which was the biggest deal in Vodafone’s corporate 
history. In 2006, it has sold its Japanese unit to Softbank 
and Swedish unit to Telenor. […] more recently, its 
Netherlands-based firm, Vodafone Libertel BV has 
acquired Telespectrum-DJ. Thus, we understand that 
Vodafone has a great amount of inorganic-strategy 
experiences like alliances, network coordination, 
mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures and sell-offs prior to 
acquire Hutchison stake for Indian operations. We 
therefore agree with Collins et al. (2009) theorem that 
“firms learn (acquire) new knowledge (Indian 
operations), and firm's prior acquisition experience 
increases the chances of subsequent overseas deals.    
Theories in STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT  
Resource-Based-View (RBV) Theory (Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984).[c] 
 
In Penrose’s view, “there is a close relation between the various kinds 
of resources with which a firm works, and the development of ideas, 
experience, and knowledge of its managers and entrepreneurs” 
(Penrose, 1959: 85). In line with Wernerfelt (1984), this theory 
presumes that a given firm shall utilize both tangible and intangible 
We test this theory at ownership view and profit 
(growth) view. As of March 31, 2012, Vodafone had a 
64.4% interest in VIL through its wholly owned 
subsidiaries, and a further 20.1% indirect holding giving 
an aggregate 84.5% equity interest or capital control 
(VGP-AR, 2012: 118). On the other hand, Vodafone’s 
subscriber-base in India has drastically increased from 
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resources for its sustainable growth. It also hypothesizes that firms 
possess infrequent and significant resource advantage when 
competitors do not have such reproduce resources (or, core 
competency) (see Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). In Rugman and 
Verbeke (2002: 770) view, “the firm’s ultimate objective in a resource-
based approach is to achieve sustained, above normal returns, as 
compared to rivals”. In others view, a firm may grow much faster 
while choosing inorganic strategies compared to organic strategies. 
However, a firm expansion requires a great deal of resources […] in 
whit it gains experiences over its growth plans.      
22.31 million in 2006 at a massive growth rate 534% to 
147.75 million in 2011. We believe that this momentous 
market growth help the Vodafone to acquire an 
additional 22% equity stake in VIL from its joint venture 
partner ‘Essar Group’ for £2.6 billion on July 1, 2011. It 
is worth stating that Vodafone has increased their 
ownership in VIL very cleverly with subsequent to their 
progress in Indian subscriber-base.        
Theory of Competitive Advantage (Porter, 1985, 1990). 
 
This theory can be viewed from the lenses of RBV theory. A firm is 
profitable if the value exceeds the costs involved in developing the 
product or service. Porter suggests that the competitiveness at the firm 
level organic strategies, for instance, low-cost, differentiation and 
focus. More specifically, competing in associated industries with 
coordinated value chains can lead to competitive advantage through 
interrelationships (Porter, 1985: 34). Thus, creating value for buyers 
that exceeds the cost […] value, as a substitute of cost, should be used 
in analyzing competitive position of a firm (Porter, 1985: 38). On the 
other hand, we found that most strategy researchers advocate that 
Porter’s (1990) diamond framework explain the international 
competitiveness of countries.  
We test this theory from two perspectives, namely 
Vodafone’s view and a given country’s view. On the one 
hand, prior to enter in the Indian-landscape Vodafone 
has gained worth-full competitive advantage in European 
market. In particular, competitive advantage in terms of 
low-cost service provider, service differentiation (for 
instance, one can watch recent innovative advertisements 
on Vodafone services), and focus market, for example, 
semi-urban and rural markets (see Appendix B). Of 
course, Akdoğu (2009) suggests that telecom firms gain a 
competitive edge through acquisitions. On the other 
hand, Indian telecom market and its residing consumers 
would experience advanced services like 3G, 4G and 
other allied products. Since 1994, Indian mobile 
customers have attracted mostly by both the mobile 
specifications and features, and service differentiation.      
Theories in CORPORATE FINANCE 
Information Asymmetry Theory (Akerlof, 1970; Spence, 1973).[d] 
 
This theory reveals that at least one party (possibly, a buyer) has 
relevant or better information compared to other party (possibly, a 
seller) in transactions where one presumes to surrender and other 
presumes to receive. Further, it creates an act of imbalance in a given 
transaction, therefore it may go wrong, delay, or failure. Akerlof (1970) 
uses automobile market as a finger exercise. He suggests that social 
and private returns differ, and in some cases, governmental 
intervention may amplify the welfare of all parties, or private 
institutions may arise to take advantage of the potential increases in 
welfare that can accrue to all parties (Akerlof, 1970: 488). There are 
models like adverse selection and moral hazard. Spence (1973) 
originally suggests the “market signaling” as a solution for adverse 
selection models of information asymmetry that initially studied in 
light of looking for a work or job.  
Similar to institutional and LOF theories, this theory 
somewhat useful or testable in our case. In other words, 
Vodafone (may be its M&A advisors) has better 
information on Indian constitutional and legal 
framework compared to government officials (revenue 
department and tax authorities). Thus, this information 
helps Vodafone to win against the counter arguments 
and penalties put forwarded by the tax officials. Finally, 
Supreme Court of India has delivered its judgment in 
favor of Vodafone by stating that “existing book of law 
does not allow tax authorities to ask or impose the 
capital gains tax on Vodafone-Hutchison deal”. It is fact 
that Vodafone has experienced lots of difficulties for 
making a foreign market entry into an unethical and 
drama-oriented politician nation. We strongly believe 
that this information would help Vodafone in future 
decision making while staying or doing operations for 
Indian consumers.      
Agency Theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1986). 
 
The firm is a ‘black box’ operated as a legal entity […] thus maximize 
the profit that should be more than net present value (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Agency theory explains the contractual relationship 
between shareholders (owners) and managers of a given firm. For 
instance, managers being offered by the incentives as a cost of owners 
for searching new ventures that allow them to gain abnormal return 
compared to existing advantages. In others view, it is concerned with 
aligning the interests of owners and managers and is based on the 
premise that there is an inherent conflict between the interests of a 
firm’s owners and its managers. In a nutshell, agency theory argues for 
a preponderance of outside directors to control for management misuse 
According to agency theory, assumed that managers do 
not perform things in timely-manner and they exploit the 
shareholders funds. Of course, this theory somewhat 
explains some issues involved in our case. For example, 
managers and M&A advisory firms could have gained 
significant incentives from this deal, which were paid by 
Vodafone and Hutchison. On the one hand, Vodafone 
has entered in a potential market, thus paid the massive 
amount or premium. On the other hand, HWL has been 
recovered from the existing loss position. As of 
mentioned in previous sections, Whalley and Curwen 
(2012b) argue that HTIL could have represented loss in 
2007 when no sale of its 100% equity interest in Cayman 
Islands based CGP Investments (Holdings) Limited to 
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of shareholder funds.[e]  Vodafone. It is worth mentioning that HTIL has invested 
roughly US$2.6 billion in India since 1995 (Tele.net.in, 
2007). In this regard, one can estimate that Li Ka-shing 
has outstandingly gained about US$8.3 billion for the 
period that stayed in India (1995-2006).    
Market Efficiency Theory or Efficient-Market Hypothesis (EMH) (Fama, 
1965, Fama et al., 1969; Fama, 1970, 1998). 
 
In Fama’s (1970: 384) view, […] in an efficient market, prices “fully 
reflect” available information. As a result, one cannot always obtain 
abnormal returns on a trade-off or risk-adjusted basis in a given period 
of investment is made. Fama et al. (1969: 1) indicate that 
“independence of successive stock-price changes is consistent with an 
“efficient-market”. (In other words, a market that adjusts rapidly to 
new information.) Further, Fama (1970) suggests that adjustment of 
security prices to three relevant information subsets: weak form tests 
(historical prices), semi-strong form tests (public announcements like 
stock splits, dividends, takeovers, etc.), and strong form tests (if 
investor group monopolistic access to any information that is relevant). 
In particular, an efficient market generates categories of events that 
individually suggest that prices over-react to information (Fama, 1998: 
284). Thus, there is overreaction and underreaction.        
Most finance scholars have been tested this theory on a 
large sample that relates to one economy or more than 
two economies. In fact, previous studies suggest that 
finance theories must be tested on a large sample that are 
associated with one corporate event announcement, for 
instance, merger, acquisition, takeover, and buyback, 
among others. Hence, we predict that ‘market efficiency 
theory’ could be proved in this case, for Vodafone Group 
Plc. However, one can examine long-time delayed 
transactions (like this case) with respect to shareholders 
abnormal returns. Accordingly, it could be tested 
whether this theory could satisfy the outcome while 
comparing with other announcements, for example, 
deals that have not been delayed. Therefore, one 
hypothesis could be developed – does a delayed and not-
delayed CB-M&A announcement produce similar 
shareholders earnings in the given economic setting.   
Notes: 
[a] As cited In Morgan and Katsikeas (1997: 70). 
[b] As cited In Whitelock (2002). In others view, the propensity of a firm to initiate foreign production will depend on the specific attractions of its home country 
compared with resource implications and advantages of locating in another country (Morgan and Katsikeas, 1997: 70). 
[c] See, for instance, commentary articles on Penrose’s contribution to the resource-based view of strategic management (Rugman and Verbeke, 2002; Kor and 
Mahoney, 2004). 
[d] Indeed, it has originally documented and approved in economics and contract law, and thereafter studied in different disciplines, for instance, corporate finance. 
Also, see Stigler (1961) for relevant findings. 
[e] As cited in Nicholson and Kiel (2007). 
[f] Also, refer to the following studies for additional knowledge: internalization theory (Rugman, 1980a, 1980b, 1986; Hennart, 1982, 1986; Morck and Yeung, 
1992; Kogut and Zander, 1993); liability of foreignness (Calhoun, 2002; Hennart et al., 2002; Luo and Mezias, 2002; Mezias, 2002; Zaheer, 2002); institutional 
theory (Zucker, 1987; Oliver, 1991; Scott, 1995; Meyer and Peng, 2005; Peng et al., 2008; Riaz, 2009); theory of transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1985, 
1995; Hennart, 1991). On the other hand, one can study – reviews on internationalization process of firms (Andersen, 1993, 1997; Rugman, 2002); and 
organizational legitimacy in multi-nationalization (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). However, for a comprehensive text on multinationals, one can refer to Hennart 
(1982), and Prahalad and Doz (1987). 
Please, see Reddy (2015c, 2015d), and Reddy et al. (2014a) for improved and revised discussions with meaningful and careful explanations.  
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Appendix A. India’s M&A regulatory framework 
In this appendix, we outline different authorities and their related acts/provisions that are attached with merger, acquisition, 
combination, amalgamation, or takeover activities within the Indian economic system. For instance, the important acts like (a) 
Companies Act, 1956; (b) Competition Act, 2002; (c) SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations, 
1997; and (d) Income Tax Act, 1961. 
(a) Companies Act, 1956 
The existing Companies Act, 1956 was formally enacted by the Parliament. It is one of the important M&A laws, which deals 
with the procedural aspects of mergers or amalgamations. By contrast, this act does not define what is merger or acquisition. 
Hence, it has suggested ‘three terms’ related to corporate inorganic strategies under Sections 390-394 in Chapter V of the act; 
the terms like “compromise”, “arrangement”, and “reconstruction”. In fact, it uses the term “amalgamation” without defining 
it clearly (see Ray, 2010). In other words, Section 390(a) indicates “no company involved in an amalgamation likely to be 
financially unsound or under winding up setting. In particular, the Companies (Court) Rules 1959, exhibits various provisions 
that should be taken care while processing amalgamations through courts. Indeed, many deals are common and uncommon; 
however, they are being court-driven mergers (Ray, 2010, p. 676). On the other hand, it does not deal when a merger 
transaction involves ‘sick industrial company’ as acquirer or target. In 2005, J.J. Irani Committee has recommended some 
provisions to improve the act, and to help local corporates for achieving their long-term strategies. In its Grant Thornton and 
ASSOCHAM Report (2012), mention that the Companies (New) Bill, 2011 is enacted keeping in view of the 
internationalization of local companies. 
Notes: See Sections 391(a), 394(2) and 396 for basic definitions related to amalgamations or mergers (Ray, 2010, p. 682). 
(b) Competition Act, 2002 
The act aims to regulate various forms of business restructuring forms like mergers, alliances, product acquisitions, etc. 
Chapter II’s Sections 5 and 6 of the act deal such business transactions. For example, Section 6 indicates that “no person or 
enterprise shall enter into a combination that cause or is likely to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition within the 
relevant market in India and such a combination shall be void” (see Jain, 2012; Ray, 2010). Prior to this act, the Monopolies 
and Restrictive Trade Practices (MRTP) Act, 1969 had governed such monopoly and competition-related issues. In Jain 
(2012), the author states that the major issues of the MRTP act was that it had not been accommodated any express provision 
for the application on anti-competitive conduct outside India (p. 116). The MRTP act has included the Section 23, stating that 
“companies should concern the government for approval of possible mergers; positively, this section has removed in successive 
reforms that mentioning pre-merger inspection no longer is being required” (Agarwal and Bhattacharjea, 2006, p. 49). 
In subsequent amendments, the Competition Bill was introduced in the Parliament in 2002 for replacing the MRTP act, and 
then Competition Act has become a regulation in 2003 under the control of Competition Commission of India (CCI). The act 
normally passes the ruling in four areas, such as, anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominance, combination ruling and 
competition advocacy (see Chatterjee, 2006). For instance, Section 5 of the act provides, what is combination; hence it is not 
distinctly defined whether a foreign entity interest comes under the combination, thus states that ‘the act is applicable in all 
combinations’. On the other hand, Section 29 explains, “CCI can initiate investigation while Section 6 is proved (Jain, 2012). 
After reading the CCI regulations, we understand that the act is well written refers to the anti-competitive measures, and the 
powers of authority and supervision, but it has utterly been failed to explain any term or definition clearly, and interpretative 
nature, as well. It is as simple to pose a counterpoint “when the given country has become liberalized in 1991 or deregulated 
the restricted polices for economic growth, it is necessary to revise and include various provisions related to both inbound and 
outbound deals, or adopt some provisions from advanced countries like European merger rulings, American merger 
regulations, and British combination laws. More sadly, neither the act has amended cleverly nor has the act adopted 
international guidelines. However, the new guidelines passed by CCI after 2007 could affect the M&A trend directly or 
indirectly. For example, the time limit for the CCI initial review is reduced from 210 days to 180 days whereas the time limit 
for passing a judgment retained at 210 days (see Grant Thornton and ASSOCHAM Report, 2012). 
(c) SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations, 1997 
This act is one of influential and straightforward regulations for takeovers and substantial acquisition of shares. It is formally 
called as “Takeover Code”. Prior to this enactment, Clauses 40A and 40B under listing agreement with SEBI usually work for 
takeover activities. Following the reforms, SEBI controls various takeover deals by the approved law “SEBI (SAS&T) 
Regulations, 1994”, which is established under Section 30 of the SEBI Act, 1992 (Ray, 2010). In due course of time, it has 
appointed a committee headed by the Justice P.N. Bhagawati to review the existing norms prescribed in the act. In 1996, it has 
approved the recommendations of the committee, and then the act has become ‘SEBI (SAS&T) Regulations, 1997’, which is 
(now) a standard code for takeovers. More recently, SEBI further appointed a committee in 2009, headed by the C. Achuthan 
to study and suggest new proposals for improving the 1997 Takeover Code. In a sequence, the committee has submitted a draft 
report in 2010, and thereafter the New Takeover Code 2011 has replaced the existing 2007 code (see Ray, 2010; Reddy et al., 
2011). In the recent budget under new Finance Bill 2012, SEBI has indicated that the threshold limit would rise from 15% to 
25%, and the open offer size (after 25% trigger) may increase to 26% from the current book guideline 20%. In fact, it is 
proposed to remove non-compete fees, suggesting that basic objective of the code is to provide equitable treatment to all 
shareholders (see Grant Thornton and ASSOCHAM Report, 2012). By contrast, Ray (2010) argues that the term ‘Takeover’ 
has not been defined but the term envisages the concept of an acquirer taking over the control or management of the target 
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firm through acquiring substantial acquisition of shares or voting rights. However, SEBI has no role to play in the current case 
(Vodafone-Hutchison deal), because no matter is connected with open offers, takeovers or substantial acquisition of shares. 
(d) Income Tax Act, 1961 
Most macroeconomic theories suggest that taxes are important revenue for government to perform various administration 
activities, and to implement diverse economic policies as well as bear those associated costs for a social good (e.g., Ezeoha and 
Ogamba, 2010). Therefore, a country needs an effective authority to carry out such activities. In the Indian institutional 
environment, the tax authorities under supervision of the Department of Revenue normally administer the rules, regulations, 
incentives and tax holidays prescribed in this act. Indeed, it provides tax incentives for amalgamations, merger of banking 
firms, demerger of a company and slump sale. In particular, Section 2(1B) of the act states, “amalgamation means the 
combination of one or more companies with existing company, or the merger of two or more companies to form a new 
company” (Ray, 2010). According to provisions mentioned in the act, the tax authorities have right to impose capital gains tax 
under transfer of asset in and out of India. For example,  the term ‘transfer’ states, “if merger, amalgamation, demerger or any 
sort of restructuring results in transfer of capital asset, it would lead to a taxable event”. In Singhania and Dastaru (2012), the 
authors point out that some guidelines prescribed in the act need to be clarified intricately to ascertain some lawful safeguards. 
In the recent Finance Bill 2012, the General Anti-Avoidance Regulations (GAAR) is introduced to control hostile tax 
avoidance doings, and to take appropriate action in such cases. Hence, GAAR provisions likely to impact foreign deals, or 
investments and private equity funds, and domestic transactions, as well (see Grant Thornton and ASSOCHAM Report, 
2012). 
In sum, most acts have amended through Finance Act, 2006 and (now) the Finance Bill 2012. 
Notes:  
Also, refer to Machiraju (2007) for Indian merger guidelines and procedure associated with different levels of jurisdictions.   
Please, see Reddy (2016) for revised and improved version of this framework.  
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Appendix B. Indian telecom services performance indicators  
 Description 2002 
December 
2005 
December 
2006[a] 
December 
2011 
December 
2012 
June 
I. Subscriber’s base (in millions) 
1 Wireline 38.33 48.84 40.30 
 
32.69 31.43 
2 Wireless 
(GSM and CDMA) 
6.54 75.94 149.62 893.84 934.09 
3 Gross total 
(Rate of growth %)[b] 
44.87 124.78 
(178) 
189.92  
(52) 
926.53 
(388) 
965.52 
(4) 
II. Traffic 
4 Mobile: GSM (CDMA)  
[minutes of use/ sub/month] 
210 393 (462) 454 (424) 332 (226) 346 (229) 
III. Average revenue per user 
5 Wireless 
[INR (US$)/sub/month][e] 
871  
(15.92)  
GSM: 362 
(6.61) 
CDMA: 
256 (4.68) 
GSM: 316 
(5.77) 
CDMA: 
196 (3.58) 
GSM: 95.77 
 (1.75) 
CDMA: 
73.46 (1.34) 
GSM: 95.47 
(1.74) 
CDMA: 
74.90 (1.37) 
IV. Teledensity 
6 Population in million 
(estimated) 
1048 1092 1107 1206 1213 
7 Wireline 3.66 4.47 3.64 2.71 2.59 
8 Wireless 0.62 6.95 13.52 74.15 76.99 
9 Gross total 
(Rate of growth %)[b] 
4.28 11.43  
(167) 
17.16  
(50) 
76.86  
(348) 
79.58  
(3.5) 
V. Internet  subscriber’s base (in millions)  
10 Internet: broadband - 6.70 8.58 22.39; 
wireless: 
431.37 
23.01; 
wireless: 
460.84 
11 Minutes of use  
(MOU/ subs/month)  
 
- 189 190 [c] [c] 
12 Average revenue per user  
(INR (US$)/subs/month)[e]  
- 210  
(3.84) 
205  
(3.75) 
[c] [c] 
VI. Hutch-Essar Limited (now, Vodafone India Limited) gross information 
13 Wireless subscriber base (in 
millions) 
[Rate of growth %] 
2.02  11.41 
(465%) 
23.31 
(104%) 
147.75 
(534%) 
153.71 
(4%) 
14 Market share (%)[d] 18.75 15.03 22.12 16.53 16.46 
15 Market leader (position) 3 4 3 3 3 
16 Gross revenue  (US$ billions)[e] - - - 1.49 1.54 
Source: Compiled from TRAI (2004, 2007, 2012). 
Notes:  
[a] We assume that Hutchison could have operated until February 2007 and then Vodafone would have started from that period, 
because the deal has announced in media in February, thus finally completed in May 2007 (see VGP-AR, 2007).  
[b] We compute rate of growth based on gross total, for instance, rate of growth for the year ended December 2006 would be “((value of 
the year 2006 – value of the year 2005)/ value of the year 2005) × 100”.  
[c] The total revenue of the internet services as reported by ISPs was US$ 0.52 billion for the quarter ending Jun-12 as compared to US$ 
0.53 billion for the quarter ending Mar-12, showing a decrease of 3.27% (TRAI, 2012).  
[d] Market share based on ‘number of mobile subscribers’; In India, most of the market share is gained by Indian-origin conglomerates 
Bharti Airtel (1st position with 20.05%), Reliance (2nd position with 16.55%), and then Vodafone (3rd position with 16.46%), followed 
by Idea (4th position with 12.54%) ... and BSNL, among others.  
[e] The amount expressed in Indian currency has converted into US dollars at the exchange rate INR 54.72 (Dated: November 06, 
2012); moreover, 40% Vodafone’s revenue comes from the rural sector, and the remaining from urban and semi-urban.  
[f] As of June 2012, there are 14 (GSM and CDMA) service providers and eight wireline providers in India. 
[g] From March 2012 onward, Vodafone had entered Fixed-line services, and it does not provide CDMA services. Indeed, it is 
permitted all over India. Further, it is one of the 21 operators in international long distance service licensees in India (TRAI, 2012). 
[h] See the overview of Indian telecommunications market during 2011-2012 (TRAI, 2012, pp. i-ii). 
[i] Abbreviations: ARPU – average revenue per user; CDMA – code division multiple access; GSM – global systems for mobile 
communications; INR – Indian rupee is the official currency of India; ISP – internet service provider; MOU – minutes of use; TRAI – 
telecom regulatory authority of India.   
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Appendix C. Analysis of the court proceedings and rulings 
In this analysis, we present both the BHC and the SC jurisdictions rulings including final judgment [in an order of rule]. To do 
so, we have borrowed the court(s) rulings from BMR Advisors (2011a, 2011c, 2012), Deloitte (2011), and KPMG (2012), as 
well. Further, we have been disguised the names and positions of the parties participated in the court(s) rulings. 
(a) Rulings of the state-level jurisdiction (Bombay High Court) 
The observations presented here with refer to the case when it was ruling at BHC jurisdiction. Firstly, the Union of India had 
assumed that the Vodafone-Hutch deal has sufficient connection with territory of India. In detail, [on December 3, 2008] the 
court had permitted tax officials to do inquiry whether the deal is liable for capital gains tax (see Singhania & Dastaru, 2012).  
In May 2010, the authorities issued an order holding that they had the essential rule to proceed against Vodafone alleging that 
failure refers to withholding taxes. Then, Vodafone filed a writ petition before the BHC stating that the transaction had 
absolutely no nexus or connection with the territory of India. However, [on September 8, 2010] BHC had dismissed the appeal 
by stating that the diverse rights and privileges acquired by the Vodafone’s VIH had sufficient bond with India, thus allowed the 
tax department to proceed further investigation (Deloitte, 2011). Indeed, the BHC had given its decision in two rounds of 
rulings. The court also argues that several other rights had been transferred besides the CGP share, which if situated within the 
province of a given country could be taxed, and the consideration should be allocated over such rights (BMR, 2011a). 
(b) Rulings of the given country’s apex court (Supreme Court of India) 
To contend the BHC judgment, Vodafone had appealed the SC. Thereafter, the SC has verified, discussed, and rejuvenated 
many terms, previous cases, and sections defined or prescribed in the existing Income Tax Act, 1961 and other relevant acts. 
 Arguments/Questions by Supreme 
Court of India 
Answers/Explanations by Vodafone Counsel 
1 The court has asked Vodafone 
Counsel on “substance theory” and 
“lifting of corporate veil”. 
The counsel has given the explanation that there are three categories of 
structures or schemes can be disregarded under the “substance” over “from” 
doctrine; thus “One off schemes, Off the shelf, and Corporate structuring with 
malafide intent” (Deloitte, 2011). In fact, the counsel has been contended 
strongly that this case falls under the aforesaid ‘third’ scheme; however, the 
corporate veil can be pierced only when there is misuse of the corporate structure 
with malafide intent. Moreover, it has argued that the upstream ownership 
structure overseas was in place for decades […] the character of a structure could 
not change with events. In addition, the corporate structure put in place by 
Hutch to make investments into India are perfectly legitimate […]. Indeed, the 
FIPB has already been approved the deal” (see BMR, 2011c). 
Notes: In other words, [i] One off schemes explains “to meet the objective of beating the tax 
system”, [ii] Tax avoidance schemes available off the shelf that often are based on circular 
transactions, which are artificially designed for beating the tax system, and [iii] Corporate 
structuring with the malafide intent of beating the tax (see Deloitte, 2011). 
2 What is the difference between tax 
havens and offshore financial centers 
(OFC)? 
The counsel has answered ‘it is as between opacity and transparency’. Further, it 
reiterated that Cayman Islands should form part of OFC category, and therefore 
it does not fall in the tax havens. 
3 The court inquires the “transnational 
structures and horizontal structures” 
The counsel has responded that ‘look through provisions’ could be applied only 
in horizontal structures. It also contended that a holding company structure 
could not be disregarded unless the transaction is a sham. In fact, the “vertical 
transnational structures” are common […] allow exit options to the investors and 
should be treated differently unlike horizontal structures. 
4 In particular, there is a discussion on 
“shifting of tax jurisdiction and tax 
avoidance device”. In this query, the 
court asks the counsel on HWL 
structure and transfer of pricing 
provisions under Section 92 of the 
Income Tax Act. 
The counsel argued that transfer-pricing provisions essentially deal with shifting 
of ‘income’ between jurisdictions. Hence, structuring of business operations to 
allocate income between jurisdictions may be regarded as a ‘device’. With 
respect to the discussion on tax havens, counsel stated that a main characteristic 
of tax havens is when the domestic tax laws allow its residents to escape taxes in 
the country of residence […] were not relevant in the Vodafone structure” (see 
Deloitte, 2011). 
5 There is an argument on “tax 
evasion”. Since, it is one of the best 
arguments exhibited between the SC 
and Vodafone Counsel 
The counsel further argues that simply (since) a subsidiary has been set up 
instead of a branch, one could not allege tax evasion (given that the tax rate 
applicable to a subsidiary is much lower than the tax rate applicable to a branch 
of a foreign company). In this regard, the court has given an example of a 
‘liaison office (LO)’ set up in India, and questioned counsel whether the tax 
authorities could make enquiries into the activities of the LO to confirm if it 
creates a ‘permanent establishment’ in India? The counsel replied that while in 
such cases the tax authorities could make an enquiry, in our case any enquiry as 
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regards the Cayman Islands entity is irrelevant. 
6 The court also discusses about 
previous SC rulings in Azadi Bachao 
Andolan case, and then pose questions 
to counsel regarding the meaning of 
the term “liable to tax” (see BMR, 
2012, Deloitte, 2011). 
The counsel has stated that the benefit of the India-Mauritius tax treaty would be 
available only if the Mauritian entity was “liable to tax in Mauritius”. It also 
contended that despite the Supreme Court ruling (which was pronounced in 
2003), the tax treaty has not been amended thereafter. 
7 They also converse on scope and 
applicability of Sections 163 and 195 
of the Income Tax Act. 
For instance, the applicability of section 195, which requires ‘any person’ 
making a payment of a sum chargeable to tax to a non-resident to withhold tax 
on the same, depends on the “tax presence” of the non-resident payer in India. 
Certainly, investment by a group company in an Indian company does not create 
a tax presence of all companies in of that group in India. In one of the 
discussions, the SC has referred couple of articles in relation to Japan and 
Taiwan tax laws, both are irrelevant to the counsel contentions (Deloitte, 2011). 
We disclose various arguments related to different provisions enacted in the Act. 
Economic reality theory, Substance vs. Form, Source of income, Control and controlling interest, Situs of the shares, Valuation, 
Place of jurisdiction, Limitation of benefits (LOB) clause in tax treaties, HWL’s group ownership structure including other 
holding structures, Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) circular, Validity of tax residency certificate, and Legislation and 
certainty (BMR, 2011b; Deloitte, 2011). 
  
In sum, we present some of the important arguments raised by Vodafone in the SC’s jurisdiction. They are 
(a) Hutch had not invested into India through a tax haven, since Cayman Islands is an Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development’s (OECD) compliant jurisdiction. (b) The structure of the Vodafone transaction is not designed for tax 
avoidance. (c) There is no “look through provisions” in the existing Income Tax Act. Lastly, [in absence of fraud] transfer of 
control of downstream firms could not be a basis for affirming tax jurisdiction (see Deloitte, 2011). 
After various hearings, arguments and answers contended by the Vodafone counsel, then SC has arrived at a conclusion on 
January 12, 2012 (see Deccan Herald, 2012; Economic Times, 2012; Hindu, 2012). Finally, [after five years] SC has given its 
judgment in favor of VIH stating, “Indian tax authorities have no jurisdiction to levy capital gains tax on Vodafone-Hutchison 
off-shore deal”. Further, the tax authorities are being directed to refund the amount US$0.5 billion deposited by the Vodafone 
as part payment towards the demand in early 2011along with interest payment (Singhania & Dastaru, 2012). The reasons 
behind this landmark decision are presented here, which were outlined by the SC. The SC also stated that genuine strategic tax 
planning could not be ruled against the book of law. The CGP structure had been operating since 1998, it is not a sham 
transaction, or a transaction aimed at avoidance of tax (see Hindu, 2012). 
“The Vodafone deal was a consolidated transaction, and each right and asset could not be dissected in order to apply section 9 
of the Act. The CGP share was located outside India, and therefore government had no jurisdiction to tax the same. Thus, 
withholding tax provisions would not be triggered in the current case. Similarly, section 163 of the Act provides for taxation on 
a representative assessee basis, also could not be invoked (Hindu, 2012). Further, there is no extinguishment of property rights 
in a given country through the transfer of shares between two foreign entities of shares in another foreign entity” (Singhania & 
Dastaru, 2012). 
Note: This appendix is direct text citations collected from various sources, available upon request.  
 
